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Abstract 
 
 
 
    This thesis argues that Anwar al Awlaki created Inspire magazine in an effort to 
promote and justify violent jihad.  Based on a thorough review of ten issues of the 
magazine, research provides evidence that Awlaki and Samir Khan sought to shape the 
identity of young male Muslims to imagine themselves as jihadis.  This thesis argues that 
Awlaki used text and photographs to subtly embellish his personal power in an effort to 
enhance the credibility of his arguments.  This thesis provides evidence that Awlaki 
through Inspire sought to normalize violent jihad and to suggest that an imagined 
“community of loners” existed and was motivated to fight, despite an asymmetric 
battlefield and a withering history of strategic military challenges.  Evidence is provided 
that Awlaki sought to assure jihadis that their efforts would be rewarded in paradise.  
Research demonstrates Awlaki’s efforts to use the magazine to convince willing jihadis 
that their efforts, though obligatory, were essential in the “defense of Islam.”  This thesis 
documents through the media the lethal intertwining of identity and allegiance to an 
imagined community.  
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                The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, 
                encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, 
                boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.  No nation imagines itself  
                coterminous with mankind.  The most messianic nationalists do not dream  
                of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation in  
                the way it was possible, in certain epochs, for, say, Christians to dream of  
                a wholly Christian planet.  
 
                      Benedict Anderson 
                         Imagined Communities 
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    Chapter One: Awlaki in Context 
1.1 Introduction 
    A primary function of media, viewed in historical terms, has been to connect indi-
viduals, groups and nations.  In varying degrees, media constitute part of the connective 
tissue which link the multifaceted identities of individuals within and across communi-
ties.  The dawning and continuing expansion of the digital age has provided fertile 
ground for the proliferation of many communities, eliminating or significantly reducing 
dependence on close geographic proximity.  Most of these new communities are general-
ly considered benign.  There are exceptions.   
    This paper’s epigraph from Benedict Anderson’s seminal Imagined Communities, first 
published in 1983, was selected to refocus a lens on the emergence of contemporary 
“messianic nationalists,” their expressed objectives, adherents and coalitions.  Anwar al-
Awlaki, a U.S. citizen and ephemeral former leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP,) is the central figure of this thesis.1  After bin Laden’s death during the raid on 
his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan on May 2, 2011, Ayman al Zawahiri became the 
presumptive leader of al Qaeda.2  A telling quotation from Zawahiri in 2005 fore-
shadowed Awlaki’s rise to prominence: “We are in a battle, and more than half this battle 
is taking place in the battlefield of the media.  We are in a race for [the] hearts and minds 
of our ummah, a global Islamic nation.”3  Awlaki’s efforts to locate, cultivate and indoc-
trinate a community of Salafi jihadists centered on Inspire, an English-language online 
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hybrid magazine which he created with Samir Khan.4  The technical production of 
Inspire fell under the guidance of Khan, Awlaki’s collaborator and lead graphic 
designer.5  The magazine’s target audience, a Western transnational Islamic community, 
is primarily based in the U.S. and Britain. 
    The central focus of the research for this thesis involves Awlaki’s use of contemporary 
web-based media--that is, Inspire magazine--to shape individual and group identity in 
order to construct a militant jihadi community.  Two central questions will be raised.  
First, how did Awlaki structure Inspire articles as part of a process to influence identity 
formation in his target audience?  Second, within the magazine, what discourses are 
strongly suggestive of Awlaki’s intent to shape individual and group identity?  Awlaki 
recognized jihad required committed fighters.  An objective of this research is to 
contribute to a better understanding of Anwar al Awlaki’s legacy, especially his efforts to 
influence identity development of young, male Muslims living in the West.  By creating 
Inspire magazine and promoting writers under the aegis of AQAP, Awlaki provided 
evidence that he sought to position himself as an Islamic scholar, a historian, military 
strategist, and a Salafi jihadist.  Awlaki sought to shape the beliefs of jihadis and shape 
their identities around a core of radical Islam.  He wanted them to see themselves as 
“defenders of Islam.”  The first step in understanding Awlaki requires reviewing his 
remarkable transformation, his own identity metamorphosis, from his role as a U.S. born 
moderate ideologue, teacher and imam into a jihadist leader of AQAP.  The effort here to 
evaluate his transformation and shifting identity requires viewing Awlaki, a key figure 
behind Inspire, in broad context.    
    The transformational surprise attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 spawned a 
massive flow of media reports and analysis within the U.S. and globally.  Uncovering the 
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buried and intertwined roots of that series of attacks is well beyond the scope of this 
thesis, though an illuminating tangent is available.  Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars, winner of 
the 1990 Pulitzer Prize for explanatory journalism, offers a rich and detailed account of 
the alliance between the CIA, Osama bin Laden and multiple Afghan tribal warlords in 
efforts to push the Soviets from Afghanistan.  Reading it demystifies bin Laden’s pre-
September 11 identity and profile, bringing him well out of the shadows.  Coll’s book 
also chronicles the treachery and duplicity of Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI,) another U.S. partner in efforts to unseat the Soviets.6 
    The 2001 attacks, initially considered improbable, and the chaotic first months which 
followed, spawned articles that tended to stimulate within the U.S. overwhelming support 
for the Bush administration’s early efforts to identify and engage those responsible.7  Not 
since Pearl Harbor had so many Americans coalesced, their cohesion reinforced by a 
mutual passage through shock, confusion, fear, anger and a desire for a response ground-
ed in a collective expression of national will.  Media attention was clearly a primary 
intent of the attackers who sought to terrorize Americans and focus a magnifying spot-
light on the death and destruction they unleashed.  Gradually, media reports shed light on 
al Qaeda leadership, evolving tactical strategies and expressed justifications.8  Anwar al 
Awlaki emerges on this landscape and eventually evolves into a key figure within al 
Qaeda.  The U.S. assessed him as a grave threat, adding him to a “targeted kill” list, 
believing he had “shifted from encouraging attacks on the United States to directly 
participating in them.”9  He was killed by a U.S. drone strike in northern Yemen on 
September 30, 2011.10  An overview of his background and a look at the main core of his 
work follows. 
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1.2 Born in the U.S.A.: From Engineering Student to Salafi Jihadist   
    Anwar al Awlaki was born in Las Cruces, New Mexico in 1971.  He was the son of  
Nasser al Awlaki, who earned advanced degrees in agricultural management in the U.S. 
and eventually became Minister of Agriculture in Yemen under President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, recently deposed during the Arab uprisings that swept across the Middle East and 
North Africa.  Anwar al Awlaki spent his early years in the U.S. and returned with his 
family to Yemen when he was 11 years old.  There he became fluent in Arabic before 
returning at 18 to the U.S. to begin college.  His early years exposed him to both Arab 
and American culture, which later would help him in addressing Western Muslims.   
    Justification for the study of Awlaki’s emergence, teaching and corpus of work can be 
linked to his prominence and his efforts to radicalize Western Muslims by espousing 
Salafi jihadism.11  On this terrain, identity and allegiance can become decidedly toxic.  
The potency of Awlaki’s message derives from his connecting Islamic fundamentalism 
and assurances of eternal salvation in the next world with political upheaval and 
revolution here on earth.  Awlaki preached that an individual’s allegiance, as a member 
of the ummah, the global Islamic “nation,” was solely to Allah.  Chris Heffelfinger 
writes, “The modern day followers of Salafism, especially those in the West, seek 
affirmation of their identity in a period where Islam is estranged from the predominant 
culture of society.  Currently, English-speaking ideologues increasingly provide an 
avenue into the movement [Salafi jihadism,] with clerics such as the Yemini-American 
Anwar al Awlaki showing their influence via connections to a number of terrorist acts 
against the U.S.”12  It should be emphasized that “jihad” in this thesis refers to violent 
struggle, reflective of its widely held meaning in the present American lexicon and 
adopting the general view of Awlaki and the perspective of Inspire.  It is well beyond the 
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scope of this thesis to explore the Koranic meaning of “jihad,” but certainly a majority of 
Muslims do not equate “jihad” categorically with violence.  John L. Esposito, a leading 
scholar, introduces a 40-page chapter on jihad with the following insightful and 
cautionary short paragraph:   
              If you were watching a television special on jihad, with four Muslim speakers, 
you might well hear four different responses to the question, “What is jihad?” 
One might say that jihad is striving to lead a good Muslim life, praying and fasting 
regularly, being an attentive spouse and parent.  Another might identify jihad as 
working hard to spread the message of Islam.  For a third, it might be supporting 
the struggle of oppressed Muslim peoples in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, or  
Kosovo.  And for the final speaker, as for Osama bin Laden, jihad could mean  
working to overthrow governments in the Muslim world and attacking America.  
However different these interpretations are, all testify to the centrality of jihad for  
Muslims today.  Jihad is a defining concept or belief in Islam, a key element in what 
it means to be a believer and follower of God’s will.13 
    Awlaki shifted from collegiate studies at Colorado State University in civil engineering 
to preaching Islam.  He “theorized that the scholarship he was given was part of a U.S. 
plot to recruit students from around the world as agents for America… I wasn’t suited for 
that role anymore.  I was a fundamentalist now.”14  Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, a 
leading scholar and analyst with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization 
and Political Violence (ICSR,) writes that Awlaki began his career as a moderate imam 
and observer but took a pronounced turn toward violent prescriptions from 2003 through 
2011.  Awlaki described the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as the pivotal event triggering his 
move toward Salafi jihadism.  In brief overview, he lived in Britain and Yemen during 
2002 and 2003, developing a reputation for his impassioned views in promoting Islam.  
He traveled to Saudi Arabia to study.  He then returned to Yemen and lived with his 
parents in the capital, but he immediately came under the surveillance of the country’s 
intelligence agency.  He was imprisoned in Yemen for seventeen months in 2006.  The 
reason, in brief summary, Scahill believes was that U.S. intelligence regarded Awlaki as 
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a threat.  Scahill quotes John Negroponte, National Intelligence Director at that time, 
stating, “It is very nice that you locked Anwar in prison.  It is good.  Because what 
bothers us is [his] preaching and his sermons, and we are afraid he will influence young 
people in the West.”15  In 2007, he went into hiding in Yemen.  He made contact with 
AQAP and created Inspire with Samir Khan, posting the magazine online in 2010.16  The 
U.S. closely watched and occasionally interrogated Awlaki for nearly a decade before 
launching the drone strike that killed him in Yemen on September 30, 2011.  His 
operational involvement with the attempt to detonate a bomb aboard a U.S. flight from 
Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day sealed his fate.  The bomber, Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab confessed Awlaki “approved him for a suicide mission, helped him 
prepare a martyrdom video and directed him to detonate his bomb over U.S. territory.”17   
Meleagrou-Hitchens writes “Awlaki’s main focus [in this latter period] has been to 
convince Western Muslims that their governments are actively engaged in a multi-faceted 
war against Islam and Muslims.”18  Meleagrou-Hitchens adds, “[Awlaki] must convince 
Western Muslims to not only disavow the ways of their non-Muslim compatriots on an 
individual level, but also to fight and kill them in Western countries.”19 He continues, 
“The most effective delivery of Awlaki’s message has thus far been through the 
internet—a medium which has been expertly harnessed by al Qaeda and its sympathizers 
over the last decade to achieve maximum penetration of, and impact within, Western 
societies.”20  Sherry Turkle, writing on the subject of identity in the digital age, observes, 
“Engagement with computational technology facilitates a series of ‘second chances’ for 
adults to work and rework unresolved personal issues and more generally, to think 
through questions about the nature of self…”  Turkle writes, “There is an unparalleled 
opportunity to play with one’s identity and to ‘try out’ new ones.”21  The relatively 
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anonymous online world offers opportunities for individuals to reimagine themselves.  
Turkle writes, “Our dangerous world—with crime, terrorism, drugs and AIDS—offers 
little in the way of safe spaces.  Online worlds can provide valuable spaces for identity 
play.”22 
 
1.3 “Inspire” Magazine: Militarizing Media in the Digital Age  
    Awlaki’s creation of Inspire magazine offers an abundant array of material worthy  
of analysis.  Ten issues of the magazine are the primary source material on which this 
thesis will focus.  The issues carry very general dates with no monthly designations.  The 
first issue is labeled, “Summer 1431/2010.”  The tenth issue is labeled “Spring 
1434/2013.”  The ten issues contain 585 pages and 231 articles.  As of this writing, all ten 
issues are available online.  See Appendix for URLs.  The magazines have a consistent 
graphic format with articles extolling obligatory jihad, strategic and military tactics, 
detailed instructions on DIY bomb-making and use of firearms, specific target 
suggestions, frequent writings by al Qaeda leaders including bin Laden and al Zawahiri, 
tributes to deceased, “martyred” jihadis and multiple articles which argue that violent 
jihad is justified.  Issues 9 and 10 were included in this research as they appeared with no 
apparent time delay following the killing of Awlaki and Khan.  While it is impossible to 
prove, it is probable that most of the content in the 9th and 10th issues was selected by 
Awlaki and Khan, as it is wholly consistent with the first eight issues.  As of this writing, 
the magazine has posted only a single additional issue, bearing the same AQAP al 
Malahem Media logo.  
    Awlaki’s continuing influence was spotlighted as recently as the April 15, 2013, 
Boston Marathon attack, via the conduit of bomb-making instructions within an early 
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issue of Inspire.23  The surviving Boston Marathon suspect, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, admitted 
being influenced by Awlaki’s Inspire magazine and, specifically, referencing the 7-page 
article within it entitled, “How to Build a Bomb in Your Mother’s Kitchen.” See Illustra-
tion 1 on page 105.  Meleagrou-Hitchens characterized Awlaki’s “role in the global jihad 
against the West [as] twofold: operational and ideological.”24  As media scholar Susan 
Sivek put it, “Inspire is a fascinating representation of multiple phenomena: the frag-
mentation in al Qaeda’s structure and message, the magazine medium’s ability to form 
communities around specific interests and promote opportunities for self-actualization, 
and the strategic use of digital media to encourage self-radicalization.”25   
    Awlaki’s ideological posture is presented in his own words in the first issue of the 
magazine in an article entitled, “Shaykh Anwar’s Message to the American People and 
Muslims in the West.”26  Here are a few excerpts from that article: “We seek to remove 
the tyrannical and parasitical rulers of the Muslim world…we are against evil and 
America has turned into a nation of evil…[addressing an ultimatum to Muslims living in 
the West] you have two choices: you either leave or you fight.”27  Examples of Awlaki’s 
operational efforts within the magazine include articles specifically describing homemade 
bomb construction, encryption of written communications and a continuing series of 
articles under the heading, “Open Source Jihad,” which offer “security measures, guerilla 
tactics and weapons training.”28  Inspire synthesizes these ideological and operational 
facets, creating a hybrid digital media, in form very much resembling a contemporary 
online version of a traditional print magazine.29  However, in content, Inspire is patently 
militaristic.  In many respects, it resembles a DIY manual of suggested military actions 
sandwiched between triumphal theological justifications and articles praising suicide 
bomber martyrs.30  
  9 
    In what might at first appear to be benign language, Awlaki has been described as a 
“media innovator” by journalist and scholar Peter Bergen, Director of National Security 
Studies at the New America Foundation.”31  This description refers to his use of the web 
to spread and market his ideas, many of them packaged as sets of sermons, but especially 
the creation of Inspire.32  While the vehicle can be described as a magazine, it is 
immediately clear to a reader that Inspire is a good deal more.  The magazine is a vehicle 
to recruit, encourage and train aspiring jihadis.  It is clearly not solely a magazine 
devoted to propaganda.  Awlaki militarized his media creation by delivering a volatile 
mixture of articles for building weapons, especially those designed to deliver lethal force 
almost indiscriminately, as well as justification for their use couched in Islamist rhetoric.  
Indeed, the first issue of Inspire offers a “Letter from the Editor” which opens with 
“Allah says, “And inspire (italics added) the believers to fight.”33  “And to die” might be 
added, because of dozens of instances encouraging “martyrs” or suicide bombers.  
Awlaki makes frequent references to martyrdom in Inspire, as will be documented in the 
findings section of this thesis.  He used Inspire to influence his readers to construct an 
identity which elevates martyrdom, even their own, to a lofty goal.  In the safe anonymity 
of the magazine’s online world, Awlaki could argue the merits of jihad in a simplistic 
binary world of good and evil, while readers could imagine themselves as daring “white 
knights” defending Islam.  Homages to deceased jihadis offered tantalizing conduits from 
the secular to the divine.34  Inspire encouraged readers to reimagine themselves as heroic 
fighters, in essence, immune to even death’s finality with assurances of paradise.  How he 
accomplished this embrace of death through shaping readers’ identities is the central 
focus of this thesis.  Placing Awlaki within al Qaeda raises a number of peripheral and 
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controversial issues that are worth noting briefly here, as they significantly increased his 
media prominence. 
         
1.4 Awlaki and al Qaeda Nexus: Issues Proliferate 
    Awlaki’s case involves many challenging issues deserving a prefatory catalog, includ-
ing the explosive collision of contemporary and decidedly acrimonious political groups, 
whose adherents’ views range from the myriad clarities of religious fundamentalism to 
those publicly tacking toward a secular and egalitarian humanism.  Thus far, genuine 
dialogue appears nearly absent between parties seeking a theocracy led by a caliphate and 
those less inclined to celestial guidance.35  Awlaki’s case has spawned other contro-
versies involving identity, national allegiance, combatant status, due process and 
governmental extra-judicial killing.  Additional flash points have arisen as free speech 
and due process rights of American citizens, specifically Awlaki and Khan, have been 
weighed against accusations of inciting, aiding and abetting treason and homicide.  
    In addition to the issues just listed, the Awlaki case deserves analysis for its potential 
effect on a critical but less obvious plane.  The case threatens to undermine the main-
tenance and durability of American soft power assets, specifically, the long standing 
protection of individual rights within a government in which a balance of power is shared 
by the executive, legislative and judicial branches.36  There is little question that Awlaki’s 
identification with al Qaeda may tend to first elevate hard power issues.  For example, in 
the following events attention was focused on a military response: the 1996 Khobar 
Towers attack in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 service personnel and wounded nearly 
400 other multinationals; the simultaneous 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Tanzania and 
Kenya, which killed several hundred; the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, which 
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killed 17 sailors and wounded 39; and finally the hallmark September 11 attacks in 2001.   
But media articles, spanning Awlaki’s life in the U.S. and his government-directed killing 
on September 30, 2011 in Yemen, reveal well-publicized circumventions of prohibitions 
against torture and assassination.37  The extent to which U.S. influence may have been 
eroded in the intense pursuit of Awlaki, bin Laden and other al Qaeda members is worth 
weighing, though that subject is far too complex to be addressed in this thesis. 
    In this thesis, text, photography and graphics from Inspire will be analyzed as primary 
source material in evaluating the magazine’s expressed purpose, hybrid character, 
subjects and themes, as well as its probable sphere of influence.  Material from 
multiple news media sources will be referenced.  In an effort to provide elite, widely 
syndicated and credible reportage on both Awlaki and the historical context surrounding 
him, articles from the New York Times are frequently cited in this thesis. 
     
 1.5 Evolving Identity and Continuing Influence 
    Anwar al Awlaki’s case--his evolving identity, allegiances and ascent to jihadist leader 
and “media innovator,” and his death in Yemen in a U.S. drone attack--forms a narrative 
which is infused with digital elements.  Much of his influence arose from his utilization 
of digital communication technologies, not only as a teacher, imam and initially moderate 
Islamic spokesperson but, also, in his terminal efforts to locate and inculcate “lone wolf” 
jihadists, especially in North America and Western Europe.   A central objective explicit-
ly stated in the magazine was to construct a digital, Salafi jihadi “community,” though 
that word seems distinctly at odds with its militant intent and with its emphasis on acts by 
anonymous individuals, instructed to not communicate directly with each other.  Abu 
Mus’ab al Suri writes in “The Jihadi Experience,” “What we now need to establish in the 
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minds of the mujahidin, who are determined to fight, is the true sense of belonging and 
commitment.”38  The content of the magazine was culled from multiple sources, 
assembled with digital software and posted online under the guidance of Samir Khan, 
Inspire’s lead graphic designer.  The magazine’s availability and notoriety on the web has 
provided a global reach, continuing well after its introduction.  Episodic but intense 
media coverage has been associated with Inspire.  The most recent example occurred in 
the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings on April 15, 2013.  Entering the 
keywords, “Awlaki Inspire magazine” generates literally thousands of hits on popular 
search engines.39  That coverage is no doubt a function of its association with the al 
Qaeda brand, high profile incidents like the Boston Marathon Bombing on April 15, 2013 
and the magazine’s atypical hybrid character.40 
    In overview, Awlaki’s life reveals major transformations.  As a young man, he evolves 
initially from an engineering student to Islamic teacher to an early Islamic spokesperson 
following 9/11 and then to an imam with U.S. congregations.41  “What unfolded between 
Awlaki and the U.S. government behind closed doors in the months after 9/11 and what 
played out publicly between Awlaki and the U.S. media at the same time is a bizarre tale, 
filled with contradictions.”42  He is described as a “media star” appreciated for his 
“interfaith outreach, civic engagement, and tolerance.”43  His evolution later to a Salafi 
jihadist, key figure in AQAP, driving creative force behind Inspire and ultimately onto 
the U.S. government’s list of individuals targeted for killing underscores his legacy as a 
prominent al Qaeda leader.44  After the following literature review, the focus of this thesis 
will return to Awlaki’s use of contemporary web-based media, Inspire magazine, to 
shape individual and group identity in order to construct a militant jihadi community. 
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Chapter Two:  Literature Review 
     The case of Anwar al Awlaki involves multiple provocative subjects which are 
relevant and worthy of inclusion in this paper.  They are presented after foundational 
literature relating to terrorism and the media.  The intersection of radical Islam with 
politics is explosive, of course.  There is evidence the belief that Salafi jihadists’ actions 
can be attributed to irrational and largely emotional zealotry is misplaced.  Literature was 
selected that offered material and theoretical concepts which taken together could offer 
insights into Awlaki’s identity and his efforts through Inspire magazine to shape the 
identity of his target audience.  Concepts involving “pragmatic radicalism” and theories 
demonstrating rational choice mechanisms offer unexpected insights into how he attempt-
ed to influence identity formation in his audience.  
 
2.1 Terrorism and Media 
    When considering contemporary terrorism and the media, the case of Anwar al Awlaki 
has received significant media attention.45  Viewing him within the wider context of 
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contemporary terrorism and the media situates him as both a prominent subject of media 
narratives and eventually as an active producer of counter-narratives exemplified by  
Inspire, the primary source material of this thesis.  A look first at dominant media 
narratives offers a starting point.  Kimberly Powell writes that a paradigm of “Us versus 
Them, or the United States versus Islam…created animosity between East and West and 
sustained a climate of fear of terrorism that is linked repeatedly to Muslims.”46  She 
references Maslog in describing how media frames influence the construction of “lasting 
images and stereotypes about groups, religions, and peoples.”47  Language is exceedingly 
influential and at times laden with meaning.  To describe an actor as a “terrorist” is to 
render a damning judgment, while “freedom fighter” or even “insurgent” usually suggests 
a noble objective, often directed at a regime judged to be autocratic or repressive.  Powell 
seeks to clarify “terrorism” and offers a definition by A. P. Schmid, “a U. N. advisor, 
who studied a variety of definitions, finding 22 similarities that he used to produce the 
following definition: 
   Terrorism is an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by a 
(semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or 
political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are 
not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen 
randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative of symbolic targets) from 
a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based 
communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main 
targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience[s]), turning it into a target of 
terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention depending on whether intimidation, 
coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.48 
Powell favors the definition above as it underscores the “communication intent of 
terrorism.”49  The original terrorist action is then given a second life through repeated 
news reports and analyzes, which are very familiar to any regular viewer of 24/7 news 
networks.  It is hardly surprising that a large segment of the general public, even one 
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sympathetic to regime change, finds the often indiscriminate carnage repugnant.  If 
Schmid’s strategic calculus makes sense in an abstract cerebral analysis, watching news 
video of bloodied innocents triggers an opposing emotional rejection of such tactics.   
    Powell references Abraham Miller’s insights regarding the “inexorable, symbiotic 
relationship” that exists between media and terrorism.50  Both the terrorists and the media 
recognize a shared prize in the production and display of a dramatic event.  The raw truth 
of the newsroom adage, “If it bleeds, it leads” is time-honored.51  The roots of the 
relationship sink deeply in Western culture, tapping corporate motives in garnering 
audience-share.52  When confronted with both cerebral and emotional challenges, 
“overload” may be most accurate, it is not surprising to see the appeal of arguments 
reduced to simplistic rhetoric by the media and by the warring parties.  Arguments and 
appraisals rendered in shades of gray lack impact and clarity.  Good and evil provides 
bold contrast and leads in fairly short order to other convenient binary divisions.53  
    An exceptional reprieve from this polarized discourse came in the cascading popular 
uprisings in the Middle East, frequently described as the “Arab Spring” in Western 
media.  The “Arab awakening” initiated in western media a positive narrative, linking 
“Arab” with “popular democratic uprisings.”  While this may seem a tangent unrelated to 
terrorism and media, it is not.  Tariq Ramadan writes of Edward Said’s classic, 
Orientalism, and offers insights into the remarkable and still unfolding democratic 
movements in North Africa and the Middle East.54  Ramadan writes, “the construction of 
the other, at whose heart lies Islam (as both religion and civilization,) establishes not only 
a self-identity but the alterity of the other…”55  Ramadan describes Western media as 
interpreting the democratic uprisings to be directed toward achieving “Western [emphasis 
added] values of freedom, justice and democracy.”  In the context of this Orientalist 
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Western narrative, Ramadan sees those participating in the uprisings as stripped of “their 
religious beliefs and practices, their culture and even their history.”56  Orientalism, 
according to Ramadan, is alive and well, though it is most clearly visible when terrorism 
and the media are in focus.  East and West become distinct, nearly palpable in Western 
media, where “Arab,” “terrorist,” and “Islam” seem to frequently interlock.57    
    The question of how al Qaeda, certainly the highest profile radical Islamist group, 
perceives the West arises.  Sinfree Makoni writes at great length about how recently 
obtained material, text and videotapes, reveals how al Qaeda envisions the West.58  
Awlaki employs in his magazine the same binary worldview expressed in the seized 
material to motivate his target audience to form their identity in direct opposition to “the 
disbelievers.”59  Awlaki attempts to convince his readers that they are defending “true 
believers.”60  Makoni writes, “The U.S. government has accumulated a library of 
hundreds of thousands of documents captured from terrorist adversaries, such as al 
Qaeda, in the course of military operations over the last several years.”61  Makoni cites 
scholars employing critical discourse analysis.  Al Qaeda refers to the U.S. and its allies 
as “true enemies, apostates and disbelievers,” underscoring the role of Islamic theology in 
defining the enemy.  In the same vein, Makoni goes on to provide evidence that “what 
Westerners perceive as suicide bombers” are viewed by al Qaeda as martyrs.  Makoni 
writes, “The jihadists view death not as a sign of defeat but as the pathway to martyrdom.  
In addition, what Westerners see as suicide is seen by al Qaeda as life affirming.”62  
Inspire argues repeatedly that individual readers, who shape their identities to model 
those of the jihadis presented in multiple narratives within the magazine, will be eternally 
rewarded by Allah.  This point is driven home in both text and photographic illustrations 
in tributes to “martyred” jihadis in the sixth and eighth issues of Inspire.63  Photographs 
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depict the deceased against a background of billowing, celestial clouds.  See Illustrations 
4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 11 on pages 108-111, 113, and page 115 respectively.  
2.2 Framing “The War on Terror”  
    An analysis of Anwar al Awlaki requires placing him in perspective on the U.S. post- 
9/11 landscape.  A fundamental background element was what has come to be known as 
“The War on Terror.”  The phrase was used by President G.W. Bush as an over-arching, 
vague, but concise reference to describe and to frame the U.S. response to the 9/11 
attacks.  The phrase, “War on Terror,” offered little or no specific reference to an 
ideology or even a recognizable group of adversaries.  It was dismissive of al Qaeda’s 
and later Awlaki’s position that the hostilities were rooted in religion.  Lewis writes, “As 
a central facet of political communication, frames define the terms of the debate; shape 
public opinion through the pervasive use of symbols; and, when most effective, lead to 
public policy change.”64  Reese describes the “War on Terror” as a “loaded and elastic 
frame” that “took on ideological dimensions, …providing linguistic cover for widespread 
political change in the name of national security…”65  Reese encapsulates the effect of 
the frame, “In short, framing is an exercise of power.”66  Robert Entman adds another 
dimension from his seminal work on framing.  He writes, “Framing essentially involves 
selection and salience.  To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recom-
mendation for the item described.”67  Awlaki frames the obligatory nature of violent jihad  
as a battle between “believers” and “disbelievers” in the defense of Islam. 
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    Alexander Melagrou-Hitchens, a scholar who has written extensively on Awlaki, 
quotes Erving Goffman, an early framing theorist, “frames are a ‘schemata of 
interpretation’ that assist people ‘to locate, perceive, identify and label’ events both 
within their immediate surroundings and on the world stage.”68  This is precisely what 
Awlaki seeks to do within the pages of Inspire.  He came to believe that his vision of 
Islam was the most accurate interpretation of the religion.  As will be documented in the 
findings section of this thesis, Awlaki used the magazine as a platform to encourage 
readers to self-identify as a Salafi jihadist, above all else.  It is useful to briefly revisit the 
genesis of Awlaki’s thinking, as reflected in his comments immediately following the 
9/11 attacks and his gradual turn to radical Islam. 
    Awlaki emerged on the national stage shortly after the 9/11 attacks, while serving as an 
imam at the Dar al Hijrah Mosque in northern Virginia.  It is remarkable that Awlaki 
initially was used by U.S. media outlets to help frame the attacks and even to provide 
some justification for a U.S. military response.69  Ample evidence is provided by Jeremy 
Scahill.  But first a few important details are worth noting.  He reports that Awlaki 
“counseled families and helped new immigrants find apartments and employment.”70  
Scahill writes that Awlaki “became a media star, called upon by scores of media outlets 
to represent a ‘moderate’ Muslim point of view.”71  Scahill reports “the leadership of the 
mosque described him as a man known for his ‘interfaith outreach, civic engagement, and 
tolerance.’  Scahill continues, “the Associated Press reported that, among those who 
attended his sermons, ‘Most said they did not find him to be overtly political or 
radical.”72  Finally, Scahill writes, “Although Awlaki delivered stinging indictments of 
U.S. foreign policy, he also condemned the attacks in strong terms.  Initially, he even 
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indicated that the U.S. would be justified in waging an ‘armed struggle’ against those 
responsible for the attacks.”73   
2.3 Anwar al Awlaki: Frame Analysis 
    Melagrou-Hitchens analyzes how Awlaki’s transformation from a moderate imam to a 
Salafi jihadist reveals Awlaki’s own dexterity in framing by “offering a simplified, easy 
to consume version of Salafi-jihadi ideology for Western Muslims.”74  The author 
introduces the concept of the “master frame,” which he defines as “unspecific, broad, 
multifaceted and associated with a variety of separate, and often rival, social move-
ments.”75  He writes that al Qaeda’s master frame unfolds as, “since Islam was first 
introduced to the world, non-Muslims have waged a physical and ideological war on the 
religion and its followers, which at present is being carried out by a combination of 
secularists, Christian crusaders and Jews.  This grievance-based injustice frame is the 
most effective tool used by all Islamist movements to mobilize their adherents.”76  “Three 
collective action sub-frames (diagnostic, prognostic and motivational) offer an identifica-
tion of the problem, solutions and motivations for collective action.”77   
    Awlaki’s diagnosis of the problems faced by Muslims gradually evolved as did his 
prognosis.  In his early years teaching and later as an imam in northern Virginia, he 
generally adhered to a moderate appraisal of an atmosphere of tolerance and acceptance 
of Muslims in the West.  That changed with the invasion of Iraq in the 2003 Gulf War.  
Awlaki moved from favoring political Islamic activism to “calling for violence against 
non-Muslims around the world.”78 
    A major focus of any group, which clearly identifies an opposing force, is the 
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preservation of group solidarity and cohesion.  Awlaki’s transformation to a jihadist 
added challenges associated with recruiting new members.  “One of the most crucial 
aspects of a recruiter’s message is the creation and cultivation of a collective identity.”79  
Indeed, research for this thesis also suggests that Awlaki recognized his primary mission 
was identical.  Very briefly, Inspire’s message removes allegiance to any traditional 
notion of a land-based nation.  According to the magazine’s narratives, identity and 
allegiance are to Allah, solely.   
    A key objective for Awlaki was creating a tightknit ideological perimeter around his 
followers, which is identified as “boundary activation” in social movement literature.  
Chung and Roemer offer another perspective on Muslim Americans “at the boundary of 
insider and outsider.”80  They focus their analysis on Faisal Shadzad, also known as the 
“Times Square Bomber,” whose unsuccessful attempt to blow up a vehicle parked in 
Times Square on May 1, 2010, nevertheless received widespread media coverage.81  
Shahzad “was inspired by the violent rhetoric of Mr. Awlaki.”82    
    In their analysis Chuang and Roemer credit Edward Said’s Orientalist paradigm and 
further argue persuasively that “insiders who resemble groups in power are represented 
with cultural codes that imply that insiders are safe, normal and rational, whereas outsider 
‘Others’ are represented with Orientalist stereotypes that imply they are alien and 
dangerous.”83  The authors refer to Deepa Kumar’s writing which evidenced Orientalist 
associations leading to the conclusion, “the West spreads democracy, whereas Islam 
spawns terrorism.”84  Chuang and Roemer’s analysis notes “persistent use of ‘explanatory 
frames which associate Muslims and Islam with terrorism, violence, and anti-
Americanism.”  The authors reference the case of Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Ft. Hood 
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U.S. Army psychiatrist who killed 13, as ultimately associating Islam with terrorism, 
which “sets up a discourse that places loyalty to Islam and loyalty to the United States in 
inherent conflict.”85    
    It is fascinating to note that this oppositional framework is equally visible in Awlaki’s 
argumentation.  He seizes on the supposed conflict between loyalty to Islam and to 
America.  He then embraces it and offers justifications for it, which will be fully 
presented in this paper’s analysis of his Inspire magazine.  Pointed examples arise in 
Awlaki’s comments on Hasan’s Ft. Hood attack.  Awlaki and Hasan had communicated 
via email over a long period as documented by Scahill.86  One year before the Ft. Hood 
shootings, Hasan “asked whether killing American soldiers is lawful or not.”87  A New 
York Times article by Scott Shane quotes Awlaki in reference to Major Hasan’s 
impending deployment to Afghanistan, “What kind of twisted fight is this?”  On the 
subject of a Muslim soldier being ordered by the U.S. to kill Muslims in Afghanistan, 
Awlaki says such a soldier would be “a heartless beast, bent of [sic] evil, who sells his 
religion for a few dollars.”88  Shane reports, “Awlaki called Major Hasan a hero and 
quotes the cleric, “The only way a Muslim could Islamically (sic) justify serving as a 
soldier in the U.S. Army is if his intention is to follow the footsteps of men like Nidal.”89  
Awlaki’s role in this matter would seem to straddle a thin line between ideological 
involvement with radical Islam and operational complicity in criminal acts.  A U.S. 
Department of Justice white paper leaked to MSNBC’s National Investigative 
Correspondent, Michael Isikoff provides legalistic details into deliberations leading to the 
placing of Awlaki on the targeted kill list.90 
2.4 Anwar al Awlaki: Inspire Magazine 
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    Produced by AQAP and largely fashioned by Awlaki and Samir Khan, the magazine is 
an example of new hybrid media in two respects.  First, unlike the vast majority of other 
magazines, Inspire exists exclusively as an online magazine or webzine.  Unless an 
individual reader prints a hard copy, the magazine has no print media version.91  Second, 
the magazine’s objectives at first appear to promote jihad in tactical and strategic military 
terms.  Those objectives are immediately evident.  It is at once a recruitment vehicle for 
jihadists, a military training manual, a primer for those attempting covert actions, 
including encrypted communications in hostile environments, and a resource for those 
seeking theological justification for indiscriminate attacks against unarmed non-
combatants.  After reading several issues of the magazine, it becomes clear that Inspire is 
equally vehement in promoting heroic jihadis as role models.  All of which strongly 
suggests that Awlaki’s primary objective in the magazine is to encourage identity 
construction, a reordering of facets of identity, intertwined with efforts to build a virtual 
community around the touchstone of Inspire.  Evidence supporting this argument will be 
presented in the findings section of this paper. 
    Inspire reflects the thinking of radical Islamists, which can be blindingly inflammatory 
to many U.S. citizens, especially during first exposure.  Briefly, notions of diversity, 
equality and pluralism, especially in the realm of religion, collide with a philosophy 
adhering to rigid doctrine, strict moral codes and the imposition of religious authority 
over civil.  These issues can obviously raise intellectual objections but pale in comparison 
to confronting the jihadist’s acceptance, by some accounts, embrace of suicide, allegedly 
in “defense of Islam.”  Within the pages of Inspire, Awlaki attempted to provide a 
resource for group validation, support and the reinforcement of common bonds.   
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    Inspire’s text and imagery plant seeds of religious zealotry that do have an internal 
logic, which to some individuals is clearly appealing and influential.  An analysis of 
“rational choice” alternatives can present credibility questions to individuals whose 
worldviews reflect profoundly different orientations.  Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl 
Kaltenthaler offer insights into the rationality of radical Islam and, by extension, 
Awlaki’s efforts to influence the construction of a Salafi jihadist identity within his target 
audience.92  The authors state their analysis is based on individuals who “take spirituality 
seriously.”  “Movement ideologies offer strategies for fulfilling divine duties and 
maximizing the prospects of salvation on judgment day.  Where individuals believe that 
the spiritual payoffs outweigh the negative consequences of strategies in the here and 
now, high-cost/risk activism is intelligible as a rational choice.”  The authors argue that if 
the premises for fulfilling the duties of jihad are accepted, “a refusal to engage in high-
cost/risk activism [would be] tantamount to violating self-interest, because it [would 
mean] they would go to Hell.”93  The writers also point to the research of Michael Doran, 
who “conceptualizes al Qaeda as a rational actor…”  Doran traces the roots of al Qaeda’s 
actions, including 9/11, as solidly anchored in pragmatism and the “principle of real 
politik.”94  Awlaki follows that tradition, creating narratives within “Inspire” which 
weave themes of identity and allegiance with the strategic and pragmatic application of 
power.  Virtually all of the articles lionizing heroic jihadis follow that pattern.95  Weap-
ons are ubiquitous symbols of jihadi power in Illustrations 2, 3, 5, 8, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 
and 23 on pages 106, 107, 109, 112, 118, 119, 121, 123, 126, 127 and 129 respectively.   
    Before concentrating on Awlaki’s efforts to shape identity and allegiance through 
Inspire magazine, a brief acknowledgment of the conceptual complexity of identity, 
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particularly Islamic identity, may be useful.  In addition, a broad overview of media and 
identity interactions will provide some context and contrast before assessing Anwar al 
Awlaki’s unorthodox, and frequently toxic, efforts in shaping identity through online 
media.  
2.5 Identities: Singular and Plural 
    Most individuals in contemporary society have plural identities, the vast majority of 
which are entirely benign.  That is, an individual usually is a member of a nuclear family, 
an extended family, a community, perhaps a trade or profession, a religious group or 
political party.  An individual may “order” his identity, especially in certain contexts or 
when pointedly asked to do so.  Identity is at once a relatively straightforward and simple 
concept, yet one that can become increasingly complex in certain contexts.  One such 
context involves immigrant experience, in which an individual may have familial and 
cultural attachments to a nation of birth as well as similar developing roots in an adoptive 
nation.  Jillian Schwedler writes, “Much of the scholarly literature on ‘identity’ is 
conceptually murky, leaving the term entirely undefined or treating it as synonymous 
with other elements of culture, such as beliefs, ideas, norms and practices.”  However, in 
an article focusing on Islamic identity, the author writes, “At the simplest level, identity 
is how individuals and groups define themselves and their relations to others.”96  
    Bernard Lewis, an expert on the Middle East, describes three kinds of “primary 
identities:  The first is blood, that is to say, in ascending order, the family, the clan, the 
tribe, developing into the ethnic nation.  The second is by place…the village, province or 
city.  The third is the religious community…  For many, religion is the only loyalty that 
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transcends local and immediate bonds.”  Lewis believes that in the Middle East, 
“membership in a religious community is the ultimate determinant of identity.”97 
    Schwedler focuses on how identities are formed, especially Islamic identity.  She  
describes the process as dynamic, citing situational and frequently changing factors.  She 
writes, identity is “not a fixed set of characteristics; it is instead the product of historical 
processes and experiences through which individuals and groups come to see themselves, 
their place in the world, and their relationship with those around them.”  She continues, 
“Islamism,” or political Islam, refers to a wide variety of often competing political move- 
ments that treat Islam as the central tenet of a political project.”98  Schwedler’s perspec-
tive in summary attests to an exceedingly diverse and complex “Islamic identity, a pro-
duct of modern geopolitical, economic, and social struggles that have crossed, blurred 
and reconstituted boundaries between ‘West’ and ‘East.’99  A frequent arena for these 
struggles is in diasporic immigrant communities. 
    Garbi Schmidt, a Danish scholar and researcher, writes of transnational Islamic 
identity formation among young Muslims in Scandinavia and the U.S.  She observes that 
many young Muslims use the internet to find answers to religious questions, frequently 
before consulting an imam.100  In fact, the internet itself facilitates a sense of community, 
providing ready links to a dispersed and diverse groups of Muslims.  She writes, “The 
idea(l) of the ummah, whether imagined or upheld by the speed of Internet com-
munication and travel, is not a materialized homeland that one may look up on a map.  
Rather, we are dealing with a mythological homeland that is both nowhere and 
everywhere, hereby offering membership across national borders.  On this imaginary 
level ethnicity and geography do not matter.  What matters is religious identity, or rather 
the thematic framework for identity formation that this transnational space offers, beside 
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the internal solidarity of diaspora members.”  Schmidt writes, “Young Muslims’ use of 
the Internet tells us about new strategies for knowledge formation, new roads to author-
ity, and new ways of establishing and maintaining Islamic networks…”101  
    Another scholar and researcher of ethnic media and immigrant communities, Karim H. 
Karim, notes “Diasporic connections are becoming increasingly significant in the light of 
what is viewed as the diminishing importance of national borders and the growing global 
linkages of non-state actors.”102  Karim observes, “The role of ethnic media in global 
communication flows is steadily growing in importance.  Sociologists and communica- 
tion scholars have viewed ethnic media as serving what may appear to be two contra- 
dictory purposes—to contribute to ethnic cohesion and cultural maintenance as well as to 
help members of minorities integrate into the larger [host] society.”103  Karim writes, 
“The impact of media use by minorities on identity formation also needs to be studied…” 
He notes very different appetites for content by age.  He continues, “The hybridity of  
cultural production and of multi-layered identities have major implications for [media 
policies.]”104   
    The insights of Schwedler, Schmidt and Karim reveal a media environment that Anwar 
al Awlaki clearly recognized as propitious for the introduction of his online magazine and 
for his efforts to shape the identity of his target audience.  If any media is “militarized,” 
Inspire certainly qualifies.  It is replete with articles on munitions, weapons use, targeting 
and encryption suggestions.   Now the focus turns to evidence from Inspire which may be 
suggestive of Awlaki’s intent.   
  
2.6 Anwar al Awlaki:  Shaping Identity and Allegiance 
      It is the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay attention 
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to as the main threat to this country. 
               Leon Panetta, CIA Director, February 2010 
 
    Coming almost nine years after the 2001 attacks, Panetta’s statement implies some 
confidence that al Qaeda’s ability to coordinate large scale, complex attacks within the 
U.S. had been seriously eroded.105  However, he identifies a new “main threat” in the 
form of individual “lone wolf” terrorists.  Not surprisingly, articles within Anwar al 
Awlaki’s Inspire, published under the aegis of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP,) forcefully propose precisely that which Panetta identified.106  In fact, Panetta’s 
assessment, in a very real sense, amounts to an unintended confirmation that al Qaeda’s 
lone wolf strategy unites al Qaeda power with a pragmatic system for its delivery.   
    A principal reason for al Qaeda’s shift in strategies may well be the effectiveness of 
the secretive drone strike program, which is reported to have begun in June of 2004.107  
Many targeted drone strikes against specific al Qaeda leaders have seriously degraded the 
command and control effectiveness of the previously hierarchical organization.  The list 
of those on the targeted kill list remains secret, as is the estimate of al Qaeda or related 
operatives who have been confirmed as killed.108  In 2013, Mark Mazzetti reports, “The 
C.I.A. has since conducted hundreds of drone strikes in Pakistan that have killed thou-
sands of people, Pakistanis and Arabs, militants and civilians alike.”109   
    Articles within Inspire reflect Awlaki’s understanding that death remains a probable 
outcome for lone wolf operatives.  These articles invariably begin with various references 
to verses in the Koran, which are intended to provide justification for the following 
article’s militancy.  Awlaki’s strategy within Inspire involves encouraging fighters to 
focus on assurances of a heroic afterlife as a martyr and to exchange traditional notions of 
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nationality for a coming triumphant, borderless ummah, a transnational global Islamic 
community under a caliphate.110  Individual identity and allegiance are redefined under 
the aegis of Islam.  
    In his analysis of lone wolf Islamist terrorists, Raffaello Pantucci writes that “terrorism 
is commonly viewed as essentially a collective, organized activity and, as a consequence, 
scholars focus predominantly on group dynamics and collective socialization to explain 
individual pathways to terrorism.”111  He sees a shift in focus taking place.  There has 
been a pronounced trend to “individual jihadists” and events that are generally small in 
scale.  See Illustration 21 on page 127 for Inspire’s depiction of a lone wolf assassin. Yet, 
there is a very real question as to whether lone wolves can be legitimately described as 
“loners.”  Pantucci writes “The observation runs that the nature of the Lone Wolf means 
he or she will not be in any contact with others, is unlikely to have gone abroad for 
training and is unlikely to be actively seeking to purchase any weaponry—all of which 
would be the trip-wires for security services to become switched on to a terrorist cell or 
individual.”  However, he refers to “the appeal of the al Qaedist ideology to what might 
paradoxically be termed the ‘community of loners’ and the increasing prevalence of the 
internet as a vehicle through which to disseminate jihadist ideology.”  That statement 
accurately describes a target audience of Awlaki’s magazine.  Pantucci notes, “According 
to prominent terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman, al Qaeda’s new strategy is to empower 
and motivate individuals to commit acts of violence completely outside any terrorist 
chain of command.”112  It is entirely possible that the functionality of “group dynamics 
and collective socialization” Pantucci describes above is likely manifest at some level 
when “Inspire” readers envision their fellow readers, an “imagined community” of “true 
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believers.”   
    Susan Currie Sivek’s analysis of Awlaki’s magazine offers insights.  She writes 
“researchers emphasize magazines’ abilities to unify audiences through the construction 
of communities around topics and the medium’s distinctive mode of address.”  Sivek 
refers to David Abrahamson’s phrase “magazine exceptionalism,” to describe the power 
of “the lack of journalistic distance among editors, authors and readers due to their shared 
personal interest in a topic.”113  When the “topic” involves religion, identity, martyrdom 
and mortality, the potency of the magazine medium would seem likely to increase. 
    Sivek writes the “magazine format’s simple familiarity may normalize [Inspire’s] 
challenging content through its representation as just another routine magazine topic in an 
everyday pop culture milieu.”  She continues, Inspire’s use of the familiar Western 
magazine format may help initiate the reader’s acceptance of the jihadi identity.”  
Photography and graphics fit well within current style parameters.  The magazine even 
uses the rap poetry form in an apparent effort to seem “less foreign and more cool,” 
according to the author.114  She adds, “Even the word choice in the ads—such as ‘diss’ 
and ‘LOL’—reflects youthful pop culture language.”  Awlaki’s adaptation of Western 
cultural elements suggests a very pragmatic communication philosophy: deliver the 
message in a style with which the target audiences are familiar. 
    Sivek states, “The primary identity promoted to Inspire’s readers is the model of the 
individual jihadi undertaking violence (primarily against Westerners) on behalf of Islam 
and its people toward the goal of the establishment of a global Islamic nation.”115  While 
broadly accurate, Sivek’s article understates the essential foundational efforts Awlaki 
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employs throughout “Inspire” to prepare a reader to be receptive to him as a credible 
figurehead and to his strict and violent views on Salafi Islam, which will be discussed in 
the findings section.  Awlaki deliberately positions himself in the magazine as a teacher, 
Islamic scholar and a Salafi jihadist.  Sivek refers to Scott Helfstein’s paradigm of self-
radicalization stages.  Helfstein identifies four stages which he identifies as “awareness, 
interest, acceptance and implementation.”116  He emphasizes “progression through these 
different stages is not uniform” and the “patterns and effects of social ties vary as people 
build their experience of radicalism.”  Helfstein writes, “Social relationships become 
increasingly important with the progression from awareness to interest and peak in the 
acceptance stage.”117  An increased desire for social relationships may well present  
opportunities for counterterrorism personnel to interdict communications or recognize 
patterns of association.   
    It is important to recognize that Awlaki’s creation of Inspire is on its face evidence of 
his awareness that those seeking to become Salafi jihadists do need some semblance of 
social relationships and to remain aware that they are not alone, but are, as Pantucci 
argues, “a community of loners.”118  The magazine’s articles seem to seek an esprit de 
corps.  Awlaki uses the magazine to praise not only those that die in their jihadi actions 
but even those who try but fail.  In the magazine’s first issue, an article entitled “The 
Operation of Umar al Faruq al Nigiri In Response to the American Aggression in 
Yemen,” praises the failed efforts of what the U.S. media dubbed the “underwear 
bomber,” who sought to bring down a Christmas Day, 2009, U.S. carrier flight from 
Amsterdam to Detroit.119  The bomber’s “operation” added a measure of fear in the U.S. 
and no doubt a measure in al Faruq al Nigri, who sustained burn wounds to his groin.  
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The article attributed these accomplishments to “direct coordination with the grace of 
Allah” and with contributions from mujahidin in Yemen, America, Saudi Arabia and a 
number of neighboring countries.”  In the article, the unidentified writer saw fit to also 
praise the “heroic mujahid brother, Nidal Hassan.”120  See Illustration 14 on page 118, 
which praises Hasan’s attack, accompanied by a large photograph.121 
    If Helfstein’s observation is correct, what constitutes “social relationships” in the 
context of Islamic radicalism in the digital age may warrant a measure of judicious 
isolation and caution.  The identity of transmitters and receivers of information is 
extremely difficult to verify over the web.  Awlaki clearly believed that to be true, as 
articles in the magazine recommend and provide detailed information to accomplish 
encrypted digital and analog communications.122  The internet may presently have the 
capacity to provide anonymity and community simultaneously, though secure and private 
exchanges would seem exceedingly rare.  It is on this contested digital landscape that 
Awlaki’s Inspire magazine exists.  An approach to analyzing it now follows. 
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
    The central focus of this thesis is on identity formation.  In Inspire Awlaki seeks to 
influence the formation of individual identity, emphasizing lone wolf jihadists, and group 
identity, a “community of loners,” as Pantucci characterizes it.123  The foundation of the 
theoretical framework relies on Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined commun-
ities,” the complex intersection of individual and group identities.124  Catarina Kinnvall 
notes, “As individuals feel vulnerable and experience existential anxiety, it is not 
uncommon for them to wish to reaffirm a threatened self-identity.  Any collective identity 
that can provide such security is a potential pole of attraction.”  She continues, “national-
ism and religion supply particularly powerful stories and beliefs because of their ability 
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to convey a picture of security, stability, and simple answers.”125  Jessica Stern’s research 
on the motivations of violent religious zealots describes “a life in which good and evil, 
victims and oppressors, were clearly defined, and martyrdom provided escape from life’s 
dilemmas and difficulties.”126  She writes in her own words, “To be crystal clear about 
one’s identity, to know that one’s group is superior to all others, to make purity one’s 
motto, and purification of the world one’s life work—this is kind of a bliss.”127  Awlaki’s 
Inspire magazine targets an audience which Kinnvall and Stern describe.  As will be 
documented in the findings section of this thesis, Awlaki seeks within Inspire to 
influence group identity formation around a de-territorialized nationalism, an imagined 
global Islamic community, the ummah.  
    The primary source material for this thesis are ten issues of Inspire magazine produced 
by AQAP under the guidance of Anwar al Awlaki and Samir Khan, which can be readily 
accessed through URLs listed in Appendix of this thesis.128  In the digital era there clearly 
exists abundant opportunities for individual alienation despite nearly bottomless wells of 
data being transmitted, sometimes targeted and, at other times, scattershot.  Arjun 
Appadurai describes these frayed connections, writing “the world we live in now [calls] 
for theories of rootlessness, alienation, and psychological distance between individuals 
and groups on the one hand, and fantasies (or nightmares) of electronic propinquity on 
the other.”  His phrase “electronic propinquity” perfectly captures the hollow and 
emotionally barren character of many digital exchanges, where touch and other physical 
cues are either absent or teasing, two-dimensional representations.  When he wrote, “One 
man’s imagined community is another man’s political prison,” Appadurai crystalizes “the 
central problem of today’s global interactions…the tension between cultural 
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homogenization and heterogenization.”129 Awlaki recognized the potential for lone 
wolves to feel alienated and in the “What to Expect in Jihad” series offers suggestions for 
combating it.  That series opens with the cautionary sentence, “Knowing what to expect 
in jihad is vital in order to avoid confusion, shock and even depres-sion.”130  Themes of 
esprit de corps and a “brotherhood” of jihadis repeat often in articles that pay tribute to 
deceased jihadis.131  See Illustration 8 on page 112 for group photo. 
    That strange alternating magnetism of attraction and rejection is easily accessed when 
paging through Inspire.  The “Taliban effect,” described by Norris and Inglehart, as 
“traditional societies consciously attempt[ing] to distance themselves and to protect their 
cultures from the foreign values, ideas and images commonly conveyed by Western and 
American media” is buried in the discourse.132  Awlaki and Khan repeatedly packaged 
their Islamic fundamentalism under layers of contemporary Western text and imagery.  
That packaging reveals a pragmatic use of language and imagery that they elected to use.  
Nowhere is this more obvious than in Awlaki’s use of the iconic American advertising 
symbol of the “Energizer bunny,” when attempting to convey the eternal character of 
paradise.133  Norris writes, “The tensions between convergence and polarization have 
been popularized by Benjamin Barber as the rivalry between McWorld and Jihad.”134  
Awlaki seems fearlessly adept at leaping between American culture and the cultural 
context of Salafi jihadism.  Inspire’s target audience of Muslims living in the West is 
well versed in the lingua franca of bold headlines laced with a bit of humor, as well as 
narratives illustrated with graphic and arresting visuals.  An example of the former is a 
DIY article, cited by the surviving Boston Marathon Bomber, entitled “Make a Bomb in 
the Kitchen of Your Mom” with a byline reading “the AQ Chef.”135  See Illustration 1 on 
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page 105.  The cover of the fourth issue of Inspire exemplifies the style of many Western 
ads by presenting an out-of-focus, presumed jihadist looking down a foreshortened gun 
barrel, which is pointing directly at the viewer.  The viewer’s eye, finding the rifle’s peep 
sight in focus, visually decodes the ambiguous image.136  See Illustration 2 on page 106. 
3.2 Methodology   
    Text and visual elements within Inspire join to create narratives, juxtaposing good and 
evil, “us” and “them,” martyrs and killers, “true believers” and apostates and other 
oppositional terms.  At first glance, encountering thematic subtleties in the magazine 
would seem as unlikely as encountering a patchwork quilt of editorial intent.  However, 
the hybridity and inflammatory content of Inspire can complicate its study.  The term 
“hybridity” is used to indicate that the magazine is atypical and reflects the conjoining of 
a magazine format with military manuals.  It resembles a typical magazine in overall 
style.  A reader recognizes a cover masthead, contents, article titles, a mixture of graphics 
with text to create attention to a given subject or theme, an editor’s column, grainy 
photographs suggesting photo-journalist origin and a dominant logo mark of the 
magazine’s publisher.  But in reviewing an issue of Inspire, the first, as an example, a 
reader encounters a toxic stew of subjects consistent with a military recruitment brochure, 
an explicit tactical military manual, a proselytizing sermon invoking Islam, endorsements 
of martyrdom, and contributions in the form of opinion articles and interviews with 
leading figures of al Qaeda.  An argument will be made that Inspire requires active 
decoding rather than normal, largely passive, reading.  Discourse analysis, “a 
methodology that seeks to uncover the hidden motivations or ideology embedded within 
text or mass media content” will be employed in analyzing ten issues of Inspire.137  
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Particular attention was paid to how Awlaki positioned himself as a jihadi, an authority 
on Islam, as well as strategic and military tactics, all in an effort to bolster his credibility 
and that of the selected contributors.  See Illustrations 18a and 18b on pages 123 and 124.  
The research involved a close reading of all ten issues of the magazine, which contained 
231 articles, spanning 585 pages.  The issues were heavily illustrated with photographs, 
27 of which were placed in the List of Figures on page vii and are cited in this thesis. 
    Selected photographs used in the magazine will be analyzed for their communicative 
power.  Awlaki and Khan elected to replicate the familiar form of a contemporary mag-
azine, when they created Inspire.  That format is replete with photographs, as is Inspire.  
The “complex relationship between photography and reality” is noted and explored at 
length by Howells and Negreiros.  Howells writes photography is “a meeting of the 
actual and the imaginary.”  The inherent ambiguity of photographs, “both reality and 
representation at the same time,” invites varied and imaginative interpretations.138  In the 
findings section of this thesis, evidence will be presented that Awlaki and Khan use 
photographs to both document reality and also to convey conceptualizations through 
imaginative digital composites.  For example, documentary photographs of young jihadis, 
revealing little more than their eyes, present mysterious and visually arresting personas to 
impressionable young male readers of Inspire.  See Illustrations 17a and 17b on pages 
121 and 122. 
    My research questions centered on how Awlaki and Khan used digital media (Inspire) 
to help create and synthesize political and theological objectives in efforts to shape 
micro-communities within an over-arching global ummah or “supra-national” Islamic 
community.  From Awlaki’s perspective, a salient benefit of the magazine’s digital 
existence is widespread availability to a massive audience.  Of course, given the N.S.A.’s 
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signals intelligence abilities, reading the magazine online may well leave a traceable, 
digital “fingerprint,” a subject which will be addressed in the conclusion of this thesis.  
“Signals intelligence” refers to the military’s efforts to track, interdict and interpret radio 
or digital electronic communications.  In any case, there are two main research questions.  
First, how did Anwar al Awlaki structure Inspire magazine articles as part of a process to 
influence identity formation in his target audience?  Evidence will be presented to 
indicate that Awlaki sought to influence the formation of an individual’s identity and how 
individuals could envision themselves as part of a community of jihadists.  Second, 
within the magazine, what discourses are strongly suggestive of Awlaki’s intent in 
shaping reader opinions and actions?  Evidence will be presented that indicates Awlaki 
recognized critical foundational elements necessary to underpinning a lone wolf jihadist’s 
identity, as well as the need to provide an operational toolbox of skill sets.   
     It is widely acknowledged that a withering campaign of drone strikes against al Qaeda 
leaders and their associates combined with intense efforts to interdict their communi-
cations impacted the organization’s military planning.  An asymmetric battlefield remains 
but al Qaeda has encountered major fractures in internal communications.  Analysis will 
also include magazine treatment of al Qaeda leadership in the context of this altered 
battlefield.  Is there evidence that one role of the magazine was to become an imperfect 
surrogate for command and control functions?  From the perspective of the target jihadi 
audience, analysis will identify how the magazine delivered general religious, ideological 
and tactical advice, as well as specific instructions for attacks calculated to inflict equal 
measures of lethality and fear.  
    It should be noted that a question of pedigree arose briefly regarding the authenticity of 
Inspire magazine, the primary source material of this thesis.  On July 1, 2010, Max 
  38 
Fisher, at that time a writer at the Atlantic Monthly, wrote an article entitled, “5 Reasons 
to Doubt Al-Qaeda Magazine’s Authenticity.”  In concise terms, the doubts referenced: 
the secretive behavior of bin Laden and Zawahiri, the originality of an article on bomb-
making, the incarceration of a frequent contributor to the magazine, the inability to trace 
the online source and suspicion regarding the existence of a “web-based online jihadi 
community.”  After outlining the five reasons, Fisher writes, “none of these doubts are 
definitive and it remains a significant possibility that the publication is authentic.”139  
Fisher has since moved to the Washington Post and co-wrote an article with Caitlin 
Dewey on the 11th issue of “Inspire,” which “devotes almost all of its 40 pages to 
glorifying what it calls the ‘BBB,’ the blessed Boston bombings.”140 
    It is not possible to prove conclusively that the magazine is published by its listed 
creators and writers.  However, U.S. media and scholars have largely disregarded other 
theories of authorship.  Research for this thesis uncovered no credible material which 
suggests “Inspire” is an elaborate “Trojan horse” developed by intelligence agencies.141  
A blog by Jennifer Lai for Slate, quoting the Washington Post, reports that “U.S. 
intelligence operatives hacked an online (sic) al Qaeda magazine last month in order to 
confuse the group’s followers.”  Another excerpt reads, “It’s unclear how the hacking 
occurred, although U.S. intelligence agencies, including the N.S.A. and the C.I.A., have 
invested heavily in cyber capabilities in recent years.  Security officials, speaking on 
condition of anonymity, said the recent operation was only the latest U.S. attempt to 
disrupt al Qaeda’s online propaganda.142  As of this writing, no one has provided any 
evidence that Awlaki, Khan or any others linked to al Qaeda or its affiliates have denied 
their role in the creation and online posting of the magazine.  The absence of such a 
denial may be the strongest evidence of the magazine’s authenticity. 
  39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Chapter Four: Findings and Analysis 
    This chapter will be divided into six main sections, in an effort to present findings and 
analysis in a coherent manner.  (Please see the Table of Contents on pages 7 and 8.)  The 
first, brief section relates to the conservative and bounded nature of Salafi jihadism as an 
ideology.  The second section provides a broad overview of the magazine, intended to 
provide a sense of the form and style of the media, as well as an introduction to key 
themes and the magazine’s most inflammatory content.  The third part focuses on subtle 
aspects of Awlaki’s discourse, which weaves a safety net of Islamic doctrine to undergird 
his attempts to shape individual identity.  The fourth section explores how the magazine 
identifies and supports group identities, both “the community of loners” and the ummah, 
reinvigorating historic notions through a contemporary narrative of urgent and obligatory 
resistance.  The latter part of this chapter offers evidence of “a quest for meaning,” which 
Awlaki saw as culminating in an embrace of Islam.  Awlaki suggests in Inspire that this 
foundational religious searching was a motivating factor in shaping his own identity and 
those of young jihadis.  The last section of this chapter contains the Discussion and 
Limitations. 
  
4.1 The Ideological Context of the Primary Source Material 
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    Anwar al Awlaki and Samir Khan created Inspire magazine and electronically 
published at least eight issues before they were both killed in a U.S. drone strike in a 
remote and sparsely populated region of Yemen on September 30, 2011.  Awlaki’s death 
came after a two-year effort to locate him, marked by multiple but failed ground and 
missile attacks.143  The first ten issues form the primary source material of this thesis, as 
it is probable that Awlaki prepared and oversaw the selection and presentation of the 
majority of material released in the ninth and tenth issues.144  (All ten issues are readily 
accessible in full color by accessing their URL’s in Appendix.)  Though he produced 
many sermons, which were reproduced on digital media and remain available online, his 
notoriety in the West is largely attributed to his role in the magazine.  The following 
excerpt from the New York Times confirms the Awlaki/Inspire linkage and conveys a 
measure of the intense animosity between the adversaries: “After several days of 
surveillance of Mr. Awlaki, armed drones operated by the C.I.A. took off from a new, 
secret American base in the Arabian Peninsula, crossed into Yemen and unleashed a 
barrage of Hellfire missiles at a car carrying him and other top operatives from al 
Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, including another American militant (Samir Khan) who had 
run the group’s English-language internet magazine.”145  That animosity is also captured 
in photographic illustrations in Inspire, in which the symbolism of America’s Wild West 
is borrowed to depict 11 of al Qaeda’s “Most Wanted” for “Crimes against Islam.”146  
See Illustrations 15 and 16 on pages 119 and 120.  
    The magazine reflects the worldview of Anwar al Awlaki, a leader of al Qaeda’s  
affiliate branch based in Yemen, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP.)  He has 
been consistently identified with Salafi jihadism, one subgroup of Sunni Islam.  Like 
other world religions, Islam reflects a wide constellation of religious beliefs and schools 
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of thought.  Mark Stout writes, “an adherence to the ideas of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) 
and a personal commitment to action are the two best markers of a Salafi  
jihadist.”  It would be difficult to overstate Qutb’s literalist view of Islam and its sole 
primacy in all matters of religious thought.147  Lina Khatib writes, “Qutb has been quoted 
as saying that a “Muslim’s nationality is his religion.”148  Qutb’s statement de-territori-
alizes traditional notions of nationality.  Stout identifies two principal goals of Salafi 
jihadists, which “are ‘restoring’ a caliphate stretching from Spain to Indonesia and 
spreading Salafi jihadism to all the billion and a half people who, as AQA (al Qaeda and 
affiliates) sees it, mistakenly call themselves ‘Muslims’ today.”  While religion occupies 
Islam’s core, its wide ideological scope encompasses political, social, and military doc-
trines.  Again, Stout notes this form of Salafi Islam, “contains all the answers that human-
ity needs and [rigidly proposes] all other ideologies are oppressive and corrupt,” an 
appraisal which certainly achieves clarity.149  
 
4.2 The Primary Source Material: An Overview 
     The magazine contains a wide range of articles.  Some cautionary notes are war-
ranted.  The variety of subjects covered and especially the inflammatory emotional 
character of many present challenges.  Many articles lack subtlety.  “France, The 
Imbecile Invader” is assuredly neither balanced nor objective.150  Other articles are less 
strident and are not lacking some nuance.  The sixth issue’s cover story, entitled 
“Sadness, Contentment & Aspiration” about Osama bin Laden’s killing, which was 
written by Samir Khan, is such.151  The article asked rhetorically, “Was it really his 
time?”  But then continues on, mixing poetry with text and expressing “contentment” that 
“the light of hope” had “achieved” martyrdom.152  Browsing issues of the magazine 
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reveals a mélange of material, including some surprising content and placement.  The 
first issue contains an unlikely article by bin Laden focusing on global environmental 
problems but predictably blaming Western corporate greed.153  In Inspire’s sixth issue, a 
full-page parody of former NY congressman Anthony Weiner occupies the left side of a 
double truck, which introduces the aforementioned Samir Khan article reflecting on bin 
Laden’s death.   Some Inspire articles elicit a strong emotional response, triggering a rise 
in saliency, which can mask less obvious editorial intent.  See Illustrations 7 and 10 on 
pages 111 and 114 respectively of deceased jihadis.154 
 
4.2a  Format and Principal Content 
    A survey of Inspire’s content will follow.  The objective is to reflect key themes, 
patterns of discourse, and probable editorial intent.  Representative excerpts will be 
included. Some articles promote direct actions, while others attempt to indirectly create 
an emotional and psychological foundation upon which readers might envision 
themselves as Salafi jihadists.  The content of the magazine provides direct and indirect 
evidence as to how Awlaki influenced a process of identity formation in his target 
audience, the central focus of this thesis.   
    No doubt Awlaki choose the magazine format for its familiarity to readers living in the 
West.  The format also acts to normalize material and to imply that the topics presented 
serve a community of readers.  Implicit in this concept of a community of willing jihadis, 
Awlaki’s discourse masks a concerted effort to suggest an esprit de corps among 
righteous “true believers.”  See Illustration 8 (uppermost photograph) on page 112.  The 
use of article headings like “News Flash, Hear the World, Government and Media 
Responses,” as well as a large number of grainy, photo-journalistic pictures, suggests that 
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Inspire is representative of news magazines.  Two juxtaposed article headings, “Inspire 
Feedback” and “Inspire Reactions,” which are included in most of the magazine’s issues, 
provide a format for the editors to selectively list commentary from supporters and 
detractors.  Awlaki’s motivation to include commentary from detractors is related to his 
probable intent to provide evidence, through the eyes of adversaries, of Inspire’s 
functionality and power to inform and influence readers.  The “Feedback” section creates 
and encourages email communication between reader and editor.  This section was 
another way that Awlaki could embellish his authority.  See Illustration 18b on page 124.  
Also, it provided an avenue for direct interaction with individual readers.  Awlaki was 
considered a teacher and for many a scholar of Islam, though he had no formal training as 
such.  Within Inspire, Awlaki was referred to by the title “Sheikh” (leader or elder.)  
Many assumed he was also the magazine’s editor.  Readers were naturally inclined to 
treat him with the deference afforded a mentor and to see themselves as “followers,” 
which is evidenced in the following excerpts.  These sample emails are typical, “May 
Allah bless you, and reward you with goodness for the fantastic job you did in publishing 
the so much needed Islamic magazine, to guide the English speaking young Muslims 
around the world, and to communicate with them.”  In a similar vein, another reads, 
“Thank you for your work of ‘inspiration.’  My friends and I have been devouring every 
word, as if it were the last morsel of food on a plate.  You are truly the mujahidin of the 
future and we hope to help you in any way possible.  Allahu Akbar!”155  Another email in 
the same section reads, “Thank you, my dear brothers, for giving me a purpose.  I wish to 
sacrifice myself, to embrace Jannah (paradise) and all that it has to offer.  I seek nothing 
in this life except martyrdom.”156  That email bears witness to a segment of the target 
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audience that is clearly receptive to the magazine’s frequent endorsements of suicide 
missions. 
    The “Feedback” page is immediately followed by the “Inspire Reaction” page.  There 
is a perverse, almost gloating, self-conscious undertone to the listing of detractors’ 
comments.  Awlaki selected the emails intentionally.  For example, the following email, 
“It was an unfortunately well-done magazine and a virtual how-to-guide for becoming a 
terrorist,” which was attributed to U.S. Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-Michigan,) who 
serves on the House intelligence committee.  Another, from the Anti-Defamation League, 
reads, “In its latest effort to reach Western audiences, al Qaeda has released its first-ever 
English language magazine that provides detailed bomb-making instructions and calls on 
followers to ‘destroy’ America.”  And finally, attributed to Rick Levanthal of Fox News, 
an email states, “During a lengthy presentation about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) for members of the security industry in NYC, an Intelligence Research 
Specialist with the NYPD’s Counterterrorism Division today called Anwar al Awlaki 
the most dangerous man in the world.”157  The intended inference readers are apparently 
to draw is confidence that Awlaki is successfully threatening and frightening or, 
minimally, getting the attention of government and media figures in the U.S.  A reader 
might reasonably conclude that “the most dangerous man in the world” must certainly 
possess significant power and influence.  To underscore this point, Awlaki elected to 
picture himself armed in a handful of the magazine’s articles.  See Illustration 18a on 
page 123.  This represents another example of Inspire’s hidden discourse, Awlaki’s using 
the magazine to raise his profile, document his elite status and imply his capacity to lead 
a campaign of Salafi jihadism.  The final act of many Salafi jihadists is regarded by them 
as noble self-sacrifice and warrants a short explanatory tangent. 
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4.2b Martyrdom  
     Martyrdom is frequently referenced in Awlaki’s magazine.  The very first issue’s lede 
cover callout reads, “May Our Souls Be Sacrificed For You” with Awlaki’s byline.  
Within that inaugural issue under the heading “Guidance of Quran Series,” Awlaki offers 
seven excerpts from the Koran, purportedly supporting his viewpoint that violent, Salafi 
jihadism is sanctioned by Allah.  Here is a brief excerpt, transliterated in Roman-alphabet 
Arabic in the magazine, followed by Awlaki’s explanation.  From the Koran, “Respond 
to Allah and to the Messenger (Mohammed) when he calls you to that which gives you 
life.”  Awlaki’s interpretation reads, “Jihad is life since it is the cause of life.  This is 
because if you do not attack the enemy, the enemy would attack you, and that would lead 
to your demise and death (sic.)”  Awlaki casts himself as a religious scholar and 
interpreter of Islamic justifications for jihad.  His discourse is intended to provide 
religious justification and support for numerous Inspire articles, which provide ideo-
logical and operational material, as well as specific tactical instructions for jihad.   
    Should jihad result in death, what awaits a martyr?  Mohammed M. Hafez, writing 
about al Qaeda and Salafi jihadism, explains that jihadis believe “martyrdom is a gateway 
to another life, not an end to life.  Dying in the path of God will achieve for the martyrs 
all the rewards of martyrdom, including: 
Remission of one’s sins at the moment the martyr’s blood is shed 
 
Immediate admission into heaven, so martyrs do not suffer the       
punishment of the tomb 
 
The privilege of accompanying prophets, saints, and righteous believers 
 
Marriage to multiple heavenly maidens 
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The right to intercede with God on behalf of seventy relatives 
 
Protection against the pain of death 
 
Entry into the highest gardens of heaven.”158 
 
Similar to Hafez’s views above, Awlaki authored a single page article, “The Prize 
Awaiting the Shadid (Muslim Martyrs,)” published in the second issue of Inspire.159  In it 
he mixes his exegesis on martyrdom, including “the people of Paradise are free to do 
what they like, whenever they like and for as long as they like,” with a bit of American 
pop culture.  In attempting to convey the concept of infinity, he writes, “it never stops, it 
keeps on going.  The Energizer bunny would die and you’re still alive in jannah 
(paradise.)”160  This reference to an iconic American ad illustrates willingness to utilize 
American pop culture elements in his effort to characterize the eternal nature of para- 
dise.  The objectives of the U.S. government and, perhaps at some level, those of jihadist 
Anwar al Awlaki coalesced in the form of multiple drone strikes in northern Yemen on 
September 30, 2011.161 
 
4.2c Strategy and Implementation of Jihad 
    Inspire issues continue to exist online and have not been published in a print media 
version.162  It is atypical of popular magazines in that and many other respects.  The 
magazine was created to reach an audience of Muslims living in the West, principally in 
North America and the United Kingdom.  It was created to locate, cultivate and indoc-
trinate a community of Salafi jihadists.  The design, text, graphics and photographic 
elements coalesce in a style many would identify with magazine media.  The media’s 
veneer is familiar to individuals living in North America or Western cultures.  Each issue 
has a traditional cover page with masthead and callouts of dominant articles, while the 
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following two interior pages function much like a table of contents.  Articles are listed 
under sub-heads labeled “Stories, Open Source Jihad, History and Strategy” along with 
miscellanea, including, for example, “The Cartoon Crusade, The Operation of Umar al 
Faruq, News Flash, Questions to Ask, and O Martyr, You Have Illuminated” and the 
pragmatic, familiar “Contact Us.”  However, when readers engage with the magazine’s 
content, the familiar format delivers material nothing like any magazine.  Looking at the 
cover stories of several issues of Inspire will illustrate that point. 
    The first issue of Inspire leads with articles reading, “What to Expect in Jihad” and the 
oft-cited “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”  The DIY bomb-making piece is 
perhaps the magazine’s most frequently cited article in U.S. media.163  (Previously cited 
as Illustration 1 on page 113.)  The second issue offers the article, “I Am Proud to Be a 
Traitor to America” by Samir Khan.  Khan’s article identified the U.S. as “raping and 
murdering” in Yemen, while the U.S. supported Yemeni President Saleh’s “donkey 
puppet” regime, which “went around capturing, killing and torturing.”164  Another article 
in the second issue, “The Ultimate Mowing Machine,” suggests attaching large 
protruding blades on a pick-up truck and driving it into a dense group of unsuspecting 
pedestrians.  The author, Yahya Ibrahim, offers various tips to inflict “maximum 
carnage.”165  The third issue lists “The Objectives of Operation Hemorrhage,” an article 
which explains in some detail how AQAP sought to transport explosives, which were 
acknowledged as intended for use in destroying Jewish synagogues.  The fourth issue 
includes the articles, “Which is Better: Martyrdom or Victory?” and “Know that Jihad is 
Your Duty, and “Roshonara & Taimour: Followers of the Borderless Loyalty.”  All of 
these articles relate to the obligatory aspect of jihad, according to Inspire’s editors.  In 
fact, every issue of Inspire, except the shortened third and seventh “Special Issues,” 
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feature articles specifically encouraging individuals toward jihad.  In the third article, 
Roshonara Choudry, a Muslim woman is praised for her unsuccessful effort on May 14, 
2010, to assassinate a British MP, Stephen Timms, with a small kitchen knife.166  
Choudry was inspired to kill by watching You Tube videos of Awlaki, containing the 
same themes Awlaki repeats in Inspire magazine.167  The Inspire article about Choudry’s 
attempted murder of Timms repeats the theme that jihad is a step toward the achievement 
of a “borderless” global Islamic nation.  The magazine’s discourse here again implies a 
“true believer” owes allegiance solely to Allah and, by extension, Islam.  As Hafez 
observes, “Nationalism fosters narrow identifications with language, land, and borders, 
not a broader unity among the community of faithful and brotherhood of Muslims.”168 
    Many of the magazine’s more inflammatory articles either explicitly or implicitly 
connect violent jihadist actions with broad themes, such as the defense of Islam and the 
prophet Mohammed, the defense of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, the establishment of Shariah  
(especially, strictly literal versions of Islamic law,) and the creation of the Muslim 
ummah.  Two of the most provocative articles have already been referenced in this thesis, 
the DIY pressure-cooker bomb instructions and the conversion of a pick-up truck to a 
“mowing machine.”169  They are not anomalies.  A brief review of four other Inspire 
articles will illustrate a wide range of targets and tactical approaches endorsed by the 
magazine.  
    All four, sample articles are part of an “Open Source Jihad” section, which can be 
found in every full-size issue of Inspire.170  The opening page is styled after a dictionary 
page with text that varies slightly from issue to issue.  The following is from the ninth 
issue and reads, “A resource manual for those who loathe the tyrants; includes bomb-
making techniques, security measures, guerilla tactics, weapons training and all other 
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jihad related activities. [The manual is] a disaster for the repressive imperialistic nations: 
The open source jihad is the Anglo-American-Israeli’s worst nightmare.  It allows 
Muslims to train at home instead of risking a dangerous travel abroad: Look no further, 
the open source jihad is now at hand’s reach.”171  The author is identified as “the al 
Qaeda Chef,” (sic) who proclaims, “It is of your freedom (sic) to ignite a firebomb.”  Six 
pages of specific instructions, with DIY text and photographs, open with “The objective 
of this workshop is to communicate with those [who] seek martyrdom operations or those 
who want to execute a slaughter to (sic) the enemies of Islam.”  See Illustration 12 on 
page 116.  The article that follows details how to create random conflagrations, noting, 
“It is difficult to choose a better place than in the valleys of Montana where the 
population increases rapidly.”  The instructions offer advice on building timers and 
detonators, as well as considerations relating to weather issues and escape strategies for 
the jihadists.172 
    Another article with the straightforward title, “Destroying Buildings,” runs three pages 
and encourages jihadis to “rent an apartment on the lower floor that occupies a corner of 
a building.”  The “AQ Chef” suggests creating a gas or propane explosion sufficient to 
cause the building to collapse.  See Illustration 19 on page 125.  Caution is advised: “If it 
is suspicious to bring in gas canisters into the apartment, try concealing them in boxes or 
garbage cans or however you see appropriate (sic.)  Small photos are included, 
identifying a BBQ propane tank and another featuring an illustration of a cash 
transaction, apparently to discourage laying down too many cookie crumbs for arson 
investigators.  Consistent with other suggestions for jihadist attacks, inflicting mass 
casualties in random acts of terror appears to be a paramount objective.173 
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    “Making Acetone Peroxide” is the title of a six-page article with text and 23 photo-
graphs to guide interested readers in the DIY construction of chemical bombs.  See 
Illustration 27 on page 133.  The pages accessible on the U.S. sites of Public Intelligence 
fortunately are heavily redacted, making proportions of ingredients unreadable.  The 
article does report, “Many of the martyrdom bombers in Palestine use acetone peroxide 
not as the primer but as the main charge for the explosion.”  Adjacent to that text, an 
accompanying photo depicts a deceased jihadi, his head uncovered, being carried aloft by 
a small crowd of unidentified people.  This article and other similar pieces are certainly 
intended to normalize, as much as possible, jihadi’s life-ending “self-sacrifices.”174 
 
4.2d Target Justification 
    A repeating theme in Inspire articles is largely buried in the magazine’s discourse.  
Jihadists are encouraged to lash out randomly at “soft targets,” accessible and unsuspect-
ing civilian populations.  Yahya Ibrahim extolls the benefits of “a random hit at a 
crowded restaurant in Washington, D.C. at lunch hour.”  He continues, “For those 
mujahid brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry…we encourage them to 
develop a weapon of mass destruction, i.e. an effective poison with the proper delivery 
method.”175  Awlaki argues the rationale for such attacks is “the defense of the 
Messenger of Allah, [which] is the main focus of the [first Inspire] issue.”176  Methods of 
attack may include firearms, various explosives, incendiaries and even adapting vehicles 
to be used as blunt-force weapons.  Awlaki writes, “It is not enough to have the intention 
of doing good.  One must do good in the proper way.  So what is the proper solution to 
this growing campaign of defamation?  The medicine prescribed by the Messenger of 
Allah is the execution of those involved…  Their proper abode is Hellfire.”177  It is worth 
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noting, the term “Hellfire,” invoked here by Awlaki, is also the name of the U.S. drone-
mounted missiles, which killed Awlaki and Khan.178  The coincidence of the term 
reaffirms the role of religion, however distorted, in the continuing conflict.  In any case, 
another voice supports Awlaki’s view.  Shayk Abu Basir, identified in 2010 as “head” of 
AQAP, is quoted in a separate “exclusive interview” article in the same inaugural issue, 
“O Muslims rise up in defense of your Messenger: a man with his knife, a man with his 
gun, a man with his rifle, a man with his bomb, by learning how to design explosive 
devices, by burning down forests and buildings, or by running over them with your cars 
or trucks.”179 
    Justification for “targeting non-Muslim civilians” is offered in the magazine, though 
the religious explanations can be abstruse.  One article by Shaykh Adil al Abbab 
explains, “the disbeliever who is in a state of war with the Muslims is killed because of 
his disbelief.  The evidence [justification] for that is in the Book of Allah such as the 
verse, ‘And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you 
find them.”  Abbab continues, “when we look at the state of the Americans and 
Europeans, we see that they are in a state of war with us because of their participation in 
elections that choose governments that wage war against Muslims.”  He concludes, “it is 
legitimate to target the people of the West and we have no doubts about its legitimacy.”  
A rambling, highlighted section of text within Abbab’s article is more direct and explicit: 
“The Jews and the Christians have attacked the Muslim nation in order to suppress their 
identity, uproot them, violate their honor and steal their wealth.  When the Muslims stood 
up to defend themselves, to protect their holy places, and to establish the rule of Allah on 
land, the armies of the tyrants fought against them in the name of the war on terror which 
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is in reality a war on Islam.  So can one say these armies cannot be targeted?”180   
    Another article attempting to explain justifications for targeting non-Muslims and non-
combatants is the cover story in the eighth issue of Inspire, which carries Awlaki’s 
byline.  He acknowledges in the first paragraph of the eight-page article that the issue is 
“surrounded with confusion.”  He states, “if women, the elderly, and [other non-combat-
ants] participate in the war effort against Muslims…by financial contribution or opinion, 
they become legitimate targets.”  The poisonous qualifiers, “financial contribution or 
opinion,” would seem to cast a very wide net of complicity, through normal processes of 
taxation and financing an army.  He continues, “women and children should not be 
singled out for killing.  But in no way does it mean that Islam prohibits the fighting 
against the disbelievers if their men, women and children are intermingled.”  Awlaki goes 
on to explain, “During the time of the Messenger of Allah, there was a form of fighting 
called bayat.  This is when the enemy would be attacked at night under the cover of 
darkness.  The attackers would ambush the enemy in their tents and houses and engage 
them in fighting.  This would lead to the deaths of men, women and children…  So is this 
form of fighting allowed in Islam?  The answer is yes.”  Highlighted text in the article 
clarifies the killing of non-combatants, “Just as the swords of the companions [of 
Mohammed] and those who followed them could not distinguish between man, woman 
and child and yet were allowed to engage in bayat, why should we [Salafi jihadists] ban 
bombings of populated areas in disbelieving countries?”181 
    Articles addressing justifications of targets and specific tactical articles can be placed a 
few pages apart.  For example, in the eighth issue, articles about using handguns and 
building chemical bombs precede an article which addresses attacking non-combatant 
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civilians.182   Multiple articles in several issues of “Inspire” offer home firearms training 
through text and photographs.  Handgun instructions illustrate proper grip and firing 
positions, as well as disassembly and maintenance protocols.183  The Russian-designed 
AK 47 is trumpeted as a reliable and widely available long rifle.184  As well as the bomb-
making articles already cited, the magazine offered a detailed, heavily illustrated eight-
page, DIY article explaining detonator construction and use.  The bomb maker, identified 
as Dr. Khateer, suggests using materials such as duct tape, 9V batteries and washing 
machine timers, which are commonly available at retail home improvement centers.  In a 
special “Advice” sidebar, he warns, “Follow the instructions carefully in the explosives 
field.  The first mistake can be the last.”185  That admonition could also serve as a 
warning to “Inspire” readers weighing the magazine’s inducements to Salafi jihadism. 
4.2e Audience Profile   
    Awlaki directly offers no such warnings in the magazine, of course.  On the contrary, 
his efforts to heroically portray martyrs assert assurances of jannah (paradise) awaiting 
them in the afterlife.  Analysis of text and photographic elements within Inspire is 
revealing.  The main target audience of “Inspire” consists of young males living in North 
America or Western Europe.  All photographs in the ten issues which depict actual 
jihadis or illustrate weapons in use show male jihadis.  In his study of radical Islam in 
America, Chris Heffelfinger provides additional evidence that Awlaki’s target audience is 
predominantly young males.  He lists a representative sample of 73 individuals from 
“hundreds of terrorism-related arrests in the U.S.”  All but one are male and 77% are 35 
or younger.186  Research for this thesis was unable to find any estimates for total read-
ership numbers.  There is no print media circulation, of course.  As issues exist online, no 
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public estimates have been made as to issues accessed from popular websites.  Issues can 
be downloaded in PDF format and passed easily between individuals via email, blogs or 
similar digital communications. 
    Text in the form of poetry is included to mimic rap lyrics in “And inspire the believ-
ers,” an article in the fourth issue.  A mercifully short sample runs,  
      “Inspiring the believers to jihad 
   Has become the newest fad 
               Paradise is beneath the sword’s shade 
               Makin’ ‘em kafirs (a non-Muslim) fade in a raid”187 
 
Other evidence of the target audience is supported by the magazine’s featuring photo-
graphic portraits of young, role-model jihadis referred to as “brothers,” which often 
include accompanying narratives in praise of their actions.  In the magazine’s first issue, 
Faisal Shahzad, 34 years old, also known as “the Times Square bomber,” is pictured.  He 
is quoted as saying, “It is with no doubt that we today Muslims, (sic) followers of Islam, 
are attacked and occupied by foreign infidel forces.  The Crusade has already started 
against Islam and Muslims with cartoons about our beloved Prophet as war drums.”188  
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 27 years old, also known as the “Underwear Bomber,” is 
feature in the same issue.  His photographic portrait shows a beaming young man in front 
of an al Qaeda flag.  Text describes him with an awkward string of adjectives, the “heroic 
martyrdom bomber brother (sic.)”189  
4.3 The Primary Source Material: Shaping Individual Identity 
    Anwar al Awlaki and Samir Khan worked deliberately to locate, cultivate and indoc- 
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trinate predominantly young, male Salafi jihadists.  To that end, Awlaki positioned 
himself within the magazine as a teacher and scholar of Islam, though he had no formal, 
academic training in religious studies.  Inspire was the chief instrument Awlaki used to 
shape the identity of jihadis.  He created the magazine and clearly intended to establish 
himself as an authority on an array of subjects and as a conduit to critical information 
pertaining to jihad.  Evidence abounds in an agglomeration of Inspire articles with his 
imprimatur or direct byline: proclaiming Islam as the one true religion, detailing the 
wonders of paradise, fielding questions from readers on justifications for jihad, defining 
martyrdom and assuring readers that it offers an assured path to paradise, creating media 
with explicit instructions for use of firearms, explosives and assorted weaponry, 
explaining verses from the Koran, establishing the concept of a de-territorialized global 
Islamic nation, identifying specific Western governments and autocratic regimes in North 
Africa and the Middle East as enemies of Islam, providing a media platform for al Qaeda 
leaders like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, providing encryption protocols, 
blessing a short list of Islamic scholars and dismissing others, endorsing ‘lone wolf,’ 
violent initiatives and lionizing living, captured and deceased jihadists.190 
    Inspire was designed by Awlaki and Khan to instigate action.  This intentionality is 
accurately described by scholars employing media effects theory.  David Abrahamson 
has written about a concept he terms “magazine exceptionalism.”  He sees magazines as 
“a product of [a] social and cultural moment and as a catalyst for social change.”  He 
writes of “special-interest magazines” playing “a special role in their readers’ lives, 
constructing a community or affinity group in which the readers feel they are members.”  
His article accurately describes Awlaki’s hybrid magazine.  Abrahamson continues, “In 
most cases, the editors and writers of magazines share a direct community of interest with 
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their readers.  They are often, indeed literally, the same people.  There is no journalistic 
distance.”  The author adds, “…the editorial content of magazines is specifically designed 
by its editors and looked to by its readers as something that will lead to action.  It is not 
information for information’s sake.”191 
    Kenneth Thompson writes of media use within immigrant communities.  He writes, 
“New technologies may be utilized to negotiate new, hybrid cultures among diasporic 
communities.”  Awlaki’s magazine fits within that description, though its intent is 
exceedingly atypical and characterized by militant resistance.  Awlaki’s ideal community 
members are ‘wolves in sheeps’ clothing,’ seeking no supportive role in a democratic or 
pluralistic community.  Nevertheless, Thompson’s observations still ring true in many 
respects, though the author was not addressing Awlaki’s magazine of resistance.  Thomp- 
son concludes, “We may be entering a new, postmodern epoch in which the idea of a 
single, nation-state based identity is giving way to a more fragmented and hybridized 
spectrum of cultural identities.  The new media—cable satellite, video, and the Internet—
offer rich sources for constructing these diasporic and hybrid identities.”192 
    Lori Peek writes of identity development among Muslims in the U.S. and describes 
some individuals who feel “forced to choose between identities.”193  Peek writes of 
“ascribed, chosen and declared” religious identities.  She writes that “most of the partic-
ipants” in her study “stated that religion was just one of the many aspects that defined 
who they were during their formative years.”  That perspective would likely parallel the 
views of a majority of young people from various faith communities in America.  Peek 
interviewed 127 Muslim students in her study and some responses were memorable and 
poignant.  Peek describes young people in her study becoming more introspective as they 
aged and more conscious of choosing to believe in Islam.  The author writes of “religion 
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as declared identity” as occurring “in response to a crisis.”  That crisis was the 9/11 
attacks.  She continues, “The overwhelming magnitude of the events of September 11 led 
many students to pray more often and increased their need for a spiritual anchor, just as 
the events did for numerous other Americans of various faiths.”  Peek writes, “Much of 
the discourse surrounding September 11 involved dualities such as “good and evil” and 
“us and them.”  Indeed, the author observed participants sensing other forced choices.  
“Just as the students were aware that they had been cast as “the Other” immediately 
following September 11, they also believed that there was some expectation for them to 
choose between their American and Muslim identities.”  The author quotes, Natasha, a 
second-generation immigrant of Egyptian descent:  “I think September 11 made me feel 
forced to choose between identities.  It was big.  You’ve got to choose one or the other, 
and they’re not going to accept you at all.”  Natasha continued, “If they’re not going to 
accept me as an American, if they’re going to tell me I don’t deserve to be here, when I 
am an American, if they’re going to try to make me feel that way, then, hey, I’m going to 
be a Muslim…  If I have to choose, I choose to be a Muslim.”194 
    The same dualities Peek describes above are also part of Inspire’s discourse.  Evidence   
of Awlaki’s desire to make Islam the central core of individual identity can be found in 
the article, “Blended Duality: Muslim and American?”195  The article carries Samir  
Khan’s byline and argues that an individual cannot be Muslim and American.  Khan 
writes, “To be a Muslim is one thing while to be an American is another.  To be the latter 
is to undertake what Allah detests and to overlook the religious texts…”  A photograph 
accompanying the article suggests an invasive and dominant secular authority.  See Illus- 
tration 26 on page 140.  Khan writes, “To say one is proud of being American is not 
merely a cultural declaration but one of allegiance.”196  In this worldview, allegiance is to 
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Islam only, as interpreted by exclusively male figureheads employing the conservative 
dogma of sharia law.  The concept of a singular, primary, exclusionary and encompassing 
Islamic identity starkly contrasts with an American identity, which, in the ideal, promotes 
tolerance and welcomes diversity.   
        
4.3a Reviewing Awlaki’s Personal Transformation  
    Though lacking academic training in Islamic studies, Awlaki’s transformation is worth 
briefly revisiting.  He experienced a metamorphosis of his own identity, which, in some  
measure, informed and fueled his efforts to shape the identity of “Inspire” readers.  
Judging by the arc of Awlaki’s life and the content of his magazine, the bedrock of his 
identity was Islam.  Awlaki “admitted that when he first went to the U.S. for college, he 
‘was not a fully practicing’ Muslim.”197  As a college student in Colorado, he 
occasionally visited an Islamic center and was asked now and then to speak.  Eventually, 
he served as an imam at the Denver Islamic Society and the Masjid al Ribat al Islami in 
San Diego, as well as chaplain at Dar al Hijrah Islamic Center in northern Virginia.  
Those experiences allowed him to gain confidence interacting with young people and 
influenced his decision to move from a career in civil engineering to a vocation preaching 
Islam.198   
    Given his transformation to a leader of AQAP, it is worth recalling that his comments 
to national news media, immediately following the September 11 attacks, revealed a 
moderate perspective on Islam.  Jeremy Scahill writes, “Listening to Anwar’s sermons 
from this era [pre-2001] there is no hint that he had any affinity for al Qaeda.  However, 
he clearly had a desire to teach, recording CD’s of his sermons and selling them in boxed 
sets.  As the New York Times put it, the recordings appear free of obvious radicalism.  
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Scahill quotes Awlaki commenting after 9/11, “We came here to build, not to destroy…  
We are the bridge between America and 1 billion Muslims worldwide.”  Memorably, 
Awlaki “is held up as a new generation of Muslim leader capable of merging East and 
West.”199  In retrospect, nothing could have proven further from the truth. 
 
4.3b Shaping Core Identity 
    Research on the role of religiosity on identity formation by Ysseldyk, Matheson and 
Anisman offers valuable insights.200  The authors recognize ten other noteworthy 
components of identity: “race, nation, caste, political affiliation, town, age, gender, 
occupation, education and class.”  However, for many the power and importance of 
religious identity is of another order, especially religiosity rooted in fundamentalism.  
The authors observe, “Some group memberships are especially central to self-concept 
and might be particularly salient under distressing circumstances.  In this regard, religious 
identity may be especially important when an individual’s sense of safety and security 
has been undermined.”  Ysseldyk et al point out, “One of the tenets that may empower 
religious identity is the steadfast belief that one’s own religion is the truth.”  They note 
that no other component of identity affects world-view like religiosity, which is capable 
of “fostering the prospect of an eternal group membership.”  The authors make clear, 
“religion serves the unique function of explicating the ‘ultimate issues in life’.”  Ysseldyk 
et al write, “Several factors are thought to feed into (Abrahamic) fundamentalist ideo- 
logy, including dualism (i.e., absolute evaluations of good and evil,) authority (e.g., of a 
sacred book or leader,) selectivity (choosing certain beliefs or practices over others,) and 
millennialism (i.e., confidence in eschatology as God’s will; however, one facet is 
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thought to be vital—reactivity, that is, hostility toward the secular modern world.”201  It is 
as though the authors were writing about Salafi jihadism. 
    The main thrust of Awlaki’s efforts to shape the identity of young Muslims living in 
the West centered on his instilling a foundational, core identity.  Awlaki sought to 
establish Islam at its molten center.  He writes, “This Islamic magazine [Inspire] is 
geared towards making the Muslim a mujahid (a jihadi, a defender of Islam) in Allah’s 
path.  We survive through jihad and perish without it.”202  Awlaki is simultaneously 
addressing an existential and pragmatic imperative.  For him identity was no mere 
abstraction or intellectual puzzle.  Within the magazine, he is attempting to lead his 
readers to find answers to existential questions: “Why am I here? What is the purpose of 
my life?  What happens when I die?  Is there a God?  Is there one true religion?”   
    To be able to answer such questions, in simple terms and especially with complete 
confidence and certainty, would no doubt be exhilarating and empowering to his target 
audience.  To that end, evidence for the euphoria experienced by jihadis is contained in 
articles which reflect on their lives.  The following excerpts are illustrative.  “He [Abu 
Hurairah] had no fear of the enemy and eagerly wanted to die in the path of Allah.  He 
[Ammar al Wa’ili] had no fear of death.  He was active, persistent, courageous and kept a 
very good temper under the worst of circumstances.”  Just before being killed by a sniper, 
Fawaz al Ma’ribi declared to his compatriots, “I swear by Allah, my beloved brothers!  I 
just witnessed a dream of jannah (paradise.)”203  The magazine presents readers with 
confrontations of good and evil, narratives of life and death, in terms which reflect a 
stark, often violent, drama.  A reader asks, “Can I join these jihadis?”  For those that 
answer in the affirmative, Inspire’s narrative suggests power, fame, and adventure lie 
ahead.  
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there is danger awaiting the disbelievers.  The mujahidin are one body and if one of them 
is somewhere you would find fear and terror spreading in that place.”204  And should 
death come?  Paradise awaits.  “The martyr who fights and dies in the path of Allah, 
undoubtedly has the greatest chance of meeting his Lord as a victor.”205 
 
4.3c Constructing Identity: Role Model Jihadis 
    If there is a single, central, repeating theme within Inspire, it is the necessity of waging 
jihad.  Awlaki made every effort to portray jihadis as heroic but also did not hesitate to 
warn readers that jihad is essentially obligatory for able-bodied Muslims.  A two-page 
article in the sixth issue of the magazine is entitled, “It is either Jihad or Disgrace. So 
Choose.” That article closes with “some [scholars] considered jihad as a pillar for the 
religion of Islam.”206  (Islam is considered by most to have five pillars, acts such as ritual 
prayers, fasting, and the once in a lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca.)  Pointedly, another 
article repeats the discourse of disgrace, “Men soar to great levels in Allah’s eyes for 
their qualities of action as opposed to inaction.  So why do you continue to rush to your 
homes and not to the palaces of Paradise?”207  Yet another article also suggests jihad is 
essentially on-going, “Jihad will continue throughout the generations of Muslims.”208  An 
article in the magazine’s eighth issue entitled, “The Martyrdom of the Commander Abu 
Ayman,” recounts the bravery and generosity of this jihadi, describes his death by 
helicopter machine gun fire, and closes with “May Allah shower him with His mercy and 
grant him paradise.”209 
       Inspire presents readers with jihadi narratives which suggest that power, fame and 
adventure will be theirs.  The magazine is replete with these pointedly masculine, gender-
based inducements to jihad.  The best single example occurs in the magazine’s sixth issue 
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with a special 18-page tribute to deceased jihadis.210  A similar 8-page article appears in 
the magazine’s eighth issue.211  A close reading of these two series of articles illustrates 
themes Awlaki favored, as well as a photographic approach, which is consistently applied 
across the magazine’s issues.  The articles’ texts incorporate themes of bravery in 
combat, devotion to Islam, love for compatriots, unfailing humor under pressure and, of 
course, thirst for martyrdom.  All photographs are of males.  There is a clear effort made 
to include photographs of the deceased jihadis which reflect their normalcy, their 
humanity, as well as other pictures that show them with weapons, suggesting their power 
and lethality as militants, or as they saw themselves, “defenders of Islam.”  These articles 
also contain raw pictures of them after being killed.  (When no post mortem picture is 
included, invariably the text reveals a missile strike left no recognizable remains.)  The 
post mortem pictures serve multiple purposes.  They document their death, perhaps 
providing a stark reminder of their martyrdom, ostensible passage to paradise, and their 
joining an “elite” fraternity of “heroic” jihadis.  Illustrations 4 through 10 on pages 108 
through 114 depict four different jihadis as martyrs and heroes.  Abu Ali al Harithi’s 
portrait is composited into the heavens with billowing clouds in Illustration 4 on page 
116.  The same background motif follows in Illustration 5 on page 117, in which he is 
shown aiming and cradling semi-automatic weapons.  Al Harithi “had no fear of the 
enemy and eagerly wanted to die in the path of Allah.  He got what he desired…a missile 
from an American drone.”212  In Illustration 6 on page 118, Ammar al Wa’ili’s portrait 
shows him smiling down from the heavens.  He also died in a U.S. drone strike.  
Illustration 7 on page 119 depicts a deceased Fawaz al Ma’ribi, reclining against a 
background of billowing clouds.  Accompanying text reads, “Around his brothers, he was 
like anyone else.  He was normal, humorous, brilliant and kind-hearted.  [He was] a man 
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with a gaze as dangerous as a lion’s.  His determination was made of iron and steel.”213  
Illustration 8 on page 120 documents esprit de corps with his compatriots, as well as 
other illustrations supporting the narrative’s homage to him.  Abu Ayman appears in 
portraits in Illustration 9 on page 121, a composite of serene clouds and a neutral 
background.  Abu Ayman was an Egyptian jihadi, and “was a generous brother with an 
outstanding character…[who] would not turn down a request from his brothers.  He was 
courageous and known for asking his brothers to allow him to perform a martyrdom 
operation.”214  Abu Ayman was credited with participating in the attack against the 
U.S.S. Cole, which killed 17 U.S. service members and wounded 39 others, and various 
unnamed operations.   Illustration 10 on page 122 displays a post mortem picture, 
documenting his death by helicopter gunfire. 
 
4.3d Visualizations of Jihadis and Paradise 
    Awlaki and Khan chose to select photographs for various Inspire articles from very 
different stylistic and narrative traditions.  Both the advertising and journalistic styles 
sharply contrast with the cold, blunt, almost forensic, documentary post mortem images.  
The photography reveals a disjunctive but pragmatic visual aesthetic, driven by com-
municative impact far more than stylistic consistency.  The articles, which are essentially 
tributes to deceased jihadis, juxtapose somewhat dreamy, cloud-filled Photoshop compo-
sites with a mixture of grainy, narrative photojournalistic images.  This photographic 
mixture strongly suggests an effort to link representative secular documentation with 
assurances of a promised paradise.  The opening page of the sixth issue’s special tribute 
to jihadis, entitled Shuhada’ (testimony) Exclusive, features a Photoshop composite of a 
white, spotless staircase, floating in the heavens toward a door with bright, radiating, 
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white light.  See Illustration 11 on page 115.  The following quote from the Prophet 
Muhammed shimmers above heaven’s gate with key lines of text highlighted.  “In the 
name of whom Muhammed’s soul is in His hand, I wish I could fight in the cause of 
Allah and then be killed and then fight and then be killed and then fight and then be 
killed.”215  The overall style of the page closely resembles the soft- sell cliché of paradise 
encountered in literature the U.S. funeral industry concocts.  On that introductory page, 
Awlaki is using both visual and textual elements to help readers imagine themselves and 
shape their own identities on earth to follow in the jihadis’ footsteps.  The message 
delivers God’s assurances of glorious rewards and an afterlife of heavenly serenity.  It 
also conveniently serves to deliver Awlaki’s chosen, obligatory jihad discourse, while 
strongly suggesting Allah’s endorsement.  The discourse subtly underwrites Awlaki’s 
personal status and power.  A reader might well infer that Inspire, bearing Awlaki’s 
imprimatur, is reflective of Allah’s teachings.  This and other evidence in this thesis 
strongly suggest Awlaki intended readers to link himself, Inspire narratives and Allah’s 
teachings.  Embellishing his personal power would very likely add to the potency and 
perceived credibility of his pronouncements. 
 
4.3e Anointing Abu Mus’ab al Suri as Jihad Strategist 
    While waging jihad is the magazine’s most dominant theme, Awlaki elected to have 
Abu Mus’ab Al Suri present military strategic theory to Inspire readers.  Awlaki had no 
direct military combat experience, though he certainly recognized that battling the U.S. 
and other Western nations presented immense challenges, especially in tactical military 
strategy.  It is important to examine al Suri’s strategic thinking in detail, which he 
expressed in all regular issues of Inspire, as waging jihad is the central tactical subject of 
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the magazine.  Awlaki’s credibility in large measure rests on convincing the magazine’s 
audience of the feasibility of jihad.   
    Al Suri authored eight Inspire articles under “The Jihadi Experiences” or “The Schools 
of Jihad,” which were essentially excerpts from his book, The Global Islamic Resistance 
Call, a 1,600 page tome, which outlined “a broad strategy for al Qaeda’s younger 
generation to follow and described practical ways to implement the theories and tactics of 
jihadi guerilla warfare.”216  Al Suri’s repeated byline in the magazine clearly indicated 
Awlaki’s endorsement of his perspective.  Al Suri’s articles also represented an effort by 
Awlaki to expand his own sphere of influence, his personal power base.  Awlaki’s role in 
presenting al Suri’s incitements further blurred the line between his own ideological and 
operational complicity in multiple terror strikes, eventually leading the U.S. D.O.J. to 
conclude that Awlaki was a legitimate enemy combatant.217  Awlaki’s credibility and the 
magazine’s efforts to shape the identity of individual jihadis, to assure them of the 
efficacy of their mission, ultimately rested on the feasibility of al Suri’s expressed 
strategy.  Al Suri was a critical link in the chain connecting Awlaki to effective jihad.  
Furthermore, Inspire proposed it could be a critical conduit to ‘lone wolf’ individual 
jihadis, to a “community of loners,” providing them with support, tactical advice, 
targeting options and Islamic justifications for their operations.  A close analysis of al 
Suri and then of his Inspire articles follows. 
 
4.3f Al Suri and Jihad: Pragmatism and Perseverance 
    Abu Mus’Ab al Suri, also known as Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, “served in the days 
before 9/11 as the facilitator who took Western reporters to meet with Osama bin Laden 
in Afghanistan.”218  Al Suri’s jihad strategies reflect a dogged perseverance, clear admis-
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sions of failures and a preference for pragmatism in small operations.219  Samuels reports 
al Suri “held Osama bin Laden personally responsible for sticking to outmoded methods 
of organization and warfare that made al Qaeda easy prey for Western armies and 
intelligence services.”220  Al Suri urged al Qaeda and the Islamic resistance movement at 
large to “abandon its hierarchical structure or face annihilation by the West.”  Alan 
Cullison, a reporter for the WSJ, in 2001 recovered a hard drive obtained in Kabul, 
Afghanistan, which contained material written by al Suri directly to bin Laden.  Al Suri 
wrote, “We are in a ship that you are burning on false and mistaken grounds,” accusing 
bin Laden of having “caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans and applause.”221   
Brynjar Lia writes, al Suri “first came to prominence in the West in late 2004 when 
Spanish investigators referred to him as a possible mastermind of the Madrid train 
bombings.  A Syrian militant with Spanish citizenship, al Suri served as a military 
instructor and lecturer in the Arab-Afghan training camps [during the Soviet occupation] 
from 1987 to 1992.”222  William Roggio reports, al Suri was “a prolific writer on strategy, 
and has been the main advocate of so-called ‘leaderless jihad,’ which urges Muslims to 
establish their own cells without linking up with al Qaeda's global network, in order to 
escape detection.  Al Suri advocated that jihadists use the Internet and other methods to 
gather their information to conduct attacks.”223  He worked as a military trainer at al 
Qaeda's notorious Darunta camp, where the terror group experimented with chemical 
weapons.  “In 2004, the U.S. State Department issued a $5 million reward for information 
leading to his capture, and said that al Suri trained terrorists in poisons and chemicals.”224 
    The most recently published credible information on al Suri is contained in an article 
by Michael Hirsh with a dateline of November 16, 2013.225  Al Suri’s whereabouts are 
unknown as of this writing.  Hirsh explains, “al Suri urges the creation of self-generating 
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cells of lone terrorists.”  In his article Hirsh writes “Anwar al Awlaki is said to have de- 
veloped his ideas from al Suri’s.  Hirsh believes [al Suri’s] “ideas don’t involve complex, 
ongoing, multinational plans developed for long periods over international phone and 
email lines,” which provide far more opportunities for penetration by U.S. and allied 
intelligence agencies.  Al Suri’s ideas are far less vulnerable to interdiction by signals 
intelligence, NSA’s forte.  Hirsh concludes, “the world of omnipresent terror [numerous 
small scale attacks] that Abu Mus’ab al Suri wants to create could become a far more 
perilous one for Americans.”226  
    Before looking closely at al Suri’s Inspire articles, it should be noted that their pub-
lication represented a gambit for Awlaki.  Though Awlaki’s magazine treated Osama bin 
Laden and his pronouncements with great deference, the promotion of al Suri’s military 
doctrine was clearly in opposition to bin Laden’s known military strategy, exemplified in 
the 9/11 attacks.  Even though bin Laden was living incognito in Abbottabad, Pakistan, 
essentially prevented from engaging in traditional command and control, his name had 
become nearly synonymous with al Qaeda’s history, power and influence.  He was a 
dominant figure on one hand, but also clearly crippled by a relentless, intense American 
surveillance campaign and an omnipresent threat of elimination, should his hiding place 
become known.  Of course, no obvious benefit could be gained from advertising a rift 
within al Qaeda.  Yet al Suri’s criticisms had obviously resonated not only with Awlaki 
but very probably within a widening circle of al Qaeda affiliates, especially AQAP with 
whom Awlaki regularly communicated.  He published al Suri’s articles repeatedly and 
encouraged his readers to engage him (Awlaki) with any questions they may have.  
Inspire articles reveal no questions or challenges were brought forth that addressed al 
Suri’s divergent strategies.  Awlaki may have come to the conclusion that Inspire readers 
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did not disagree with al Suri.  In the absence of legitimate “Inspire” reader research, a 
highly unlikely prospect, it is not possible at this point to know if “benign neglect” of bin 
Laden’s tactics may have been a factor.  Certainly, no Inspire articles argued in favor of 
large-scale attacks like those on 9/11.  In any case, Awlaki gained influence in his 
successful inclusion of al Suri’s strategies for jihad, which were claimed to be highly 
resistant to interdiction and, in a word, offered hope.  A close look at al Suri’s articles 
now follows. 
    The “Inspire” articles, which Abu Mus’ab al Suri authored, are excerpted from his 
treatise, The Global Islamic Resistance Call.  These articles are critically important, as 
they provide the foundational, tactical and strategic rationale supporting Awlaki’s central 
mission: inspiring Muslims, especially those living in the North America and Britain, to 
imagine themselves as Salafi jihadis.  Awlaki recognized his work to shape their indivi-
dual identities could not succeed, unless jihad was seen by his readers as credible, 
justifiable and feasible.  Al Suri’s articles provided a framework to build reader 
confidence in jihad by providing: a historical framework from an experienced jihadi, an 
analysis of multiple, military strategies or “schools of jihad” with a candid appraisal of 
failures and documented achievements, identification of contemporary battlefields, a 
pragmatic plan for instigating systematic, widespread attacks and, finally, securing 
support from an awakened, de-territorialized, global Islamic ummah. 
    Al Suri’s articles begin by his laying out his credentials as a widely experienced jihadi 
and also a mature, reflective strategist and author.  His articles are accompanied by small 
portraits, which suggest his age (presently thought to be 55 years.)  He cites his fighting 
in Afghanistan against the Soviets, and later, the Americans, as well as his combat exper-
ience in Algeria and Syria.  He underscores his pragmatism, that he was not concerned 
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with technicalities, “doctrines or laws about what is haram (forbidden) or halal (permis-
sible.)227  Rather, his judgments were “based on lessons drawn from experience with the 
issues of opinion, war and stratagem.”  He lays out three, encompassing “schools of 
jihad.”  He identifies them as: “The school of secret military organizations (regional-
secret-hierarchical,) the school of open fronts and overt confrontations, and the school of 
individual jihad and small cell terrorism.”228  Compared with deceased jihadis that are 
profiled in many of the magazines issues, al Suri, while a deeply religious Muslim 
fighter, does not appear to be enamored with the concept of martyrdom.  His analysis of 
the three jihad strategies and his brief imprisonments suggests he is focused on living to 
fight another day.  
    Al Suri concludes that the first school, characterized by regional, secret, and hier-
archial organizations was largely ineffective.  These were attempted in Egypt and Syria 
and resulted in “military failure, disbandment of the secret organizations, inability to 
mobilize the Islamic ummah, educational failure [engendering popular support,] political 
failure [toppling the government in power.]”  Al Suri’s appraisal of the school of open 
fronts and overt confrontations yielded mixed results.  He writes this school is 
exemplified by “well-known…recent experiences in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya.” 
He judged this school to achieve “military success, security success in curtailing the role 
of the intelligence [agencies,] the successful mobilization of the Islamic ummah, partial 
educational success in the military camps and at the fronts” but “political failure except in 
the case of Afghanistan, where an Islamic state was established [the ephemeral rule of the 
Taliban.]”229 
    His initial appraisal of the “school of individual jihad and small cell terrorism,” which 
appears in the magazine’s first issue, reveals guarded optimism.  He offers several exam-
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ples, all of which involve the slaying of one or several victims.  The most high-profile 
case was the 1990 murder of an Orthodox rabbi, Meir Kahane, in NYC.  In other 
examples, he praises “a Jordanian soldier from the Border Guards [who] boldly opened 
fire at a number of female Jewish students, who were making movements that were  
mocking the Muslim prayer” and lauds “the heroic [Egyptian] Suleyman Khatir [who]  
opened fire, by independent decision, at a number of Jews at the Egyptian-Israeli  
border.”  He also was impressed, “During the days of the Gulf War, [when] an old 
Moroccan stabbed ten French tourists.”230  The intense hatred that apparently fuels al 
Suri’s accolades is frightening to contemplate.  In any case, he summarizes and cites 
“military success, security success because these are operations that do not lead to the 
failure of establishing new cells, success [in mobilizing] the Islamic ummah, educational 
failure due to the absence of a [systematic program,] and political failure due to the 
absence of a program [to promote the widespread expansion of such slayings.]231  Al 
Suri makes ominous reference to the “New World Order,” a conspiracy theory, which for 
him amounted to a nearly global cabal of anti-Islamic forces with ill-defined but general-
ly murderous intentions.  He defends the open front jihad strategy in specific countries 
and under certain conditions but recognizes America’s “stunning technological superior- 
ity…and complete control over [air] space and the electronic world [an apparent refer- 
ence to signals intelligence.]”232   
    By the end of the second Inspire article, it becomes clear that al Suri sees individual 
and small cell terrorism as the most likely to succeed under conditions present at the 
beginning of the 21st century.  But he chooses to emphasize a critical component 
necessary for the success of even limited, small cell jihad, “the idea of belonging to the 
whole Islamic nation, the larger homeland,” the ummah.  His writings as a whole suggest 
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he recognizes a psychological and motivational benefit in the conceptualized ummah.  In 
his own words, “What we now need to establish in the minds of the mujahidin who are 
determined to fight is a true sense of belonging and commitment.”233  On a digital 
landscape, Awlaki uses Inspire in an effort to instill a sense of community in his target 
audience and repeatedly seeks “to restore the Islamic caliphate which extends from China 
in the East to Andalusia (Spain) in the West…indeed beyond that according to capability 
until the land of the kuffar (disbelievers) is conquered.”234 
 
4.3g An Alliance for Jihad: Awlaki and al Suri 
    To briefly recap, Awlaki’s efforts in the magazine are focused on the promotion of 
jihad, a specific and feasible individual jihad or what has been termed “small cell terror- 
ism.”  The chief spokesman, theorist and strategist is Abu Mus’ab al Suri.  He sees this 
form of jihad as an essential phase, ultimately leading to open front jihad, which encom- 
passes the “seizure of land,” the critical “strategic goal for the resistance project.”235  
While both Awlaki and al Suri envision a de-territorialized global Islamic ummah, there 
is a clear realization that many Islamic nations with traditional territorial boundaries must 
first exist, coalescing into a powerful union at some future date.  Al Suri unequivocally 
states that America’s overwhelming technological superiority has created a dramatic 
battlefield imbalance, which requires a response of stinging, random terror strikes, even- 
tually “exhausting the enemy and causing him to collapse and withdraw.”  According to 
al Suri, the conditions and timing to achieve fruition is dependent on regional, “geograph-
ical, population, and political factors.”236  In advance of that fruition, the question arises, 
is there evidence that one role of the magazine was to become an imperfect surrogate for 
command and control functions?  As has been documented, al Suri states unequivocally 
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that the present battlefield is exceedingly asymmetric.237  The NSA’s massive signals 
intelligence capacity, combined with relentless U.S. drone strikes, without question has 
complicated al Qaeda’s hierarchical command and control.  As has been documented in 
this thesis, Inspire includes articles on military strategy, specific targeting, tactical 
techniques, encryption protocols and use and construction of multiple explosive devices. 
Though clearly imperfect and broadcast in scattershot, the magazine definitely attempted 
to direct and, to a limited extent, control the actions of individual jihadis.  
    Al Suri addresses the semantics of terrorism, as he approaches a full-blown campaign 
to promote “lone-wolf” attacks, a useful descriptor not in the magazine’s approved lexi- 
con.  In concise terms, al Suri describes “blameworthy terrorism,” which he sees as based 
on “falsehood” and which can be “defined as every action, speech or behavior that 
inflicts harm and fear among the innocent without true cause.”  The “perpetrator is a 
‘criminal terrorist’ who deserves to be punished.”  On the other hand, al Suri argues for  
“praiseworthy terrorism,” seeing it as “terrorism by the righteous that have been unjustly 
treated.”  It “is the terrorism of those who resist occupation and of people defending 
themselves.”238  The power of language is nowhere more apparent in the magazine.  The 
Salafi jihadists confidently proclaim, “terrorizing the enemies is a religious duty” and, for 
good measure, “assassinating their leaders is a Prophetic tradition!”  See Illustrations 15 
and 16 on pages 119 and 120 for the magazine’s “Wanted Dead or Alive” photographic 
spread.239  The exclamation point is followed in al Suri’s fifth article by paragraphs of 
Koranic justifications, which are accompanied by photographic illustrations of jihadis 
aiming rifles at the reader.240  Here, again, the magazine uses photographs of jihadis with 
weapons to drive home concepts of power and lethality.   
    Lest readers miss the linkage to Awlaki’s personal power, he elected to periodically 
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picture himself as a well-armed mujahid.  See Illustration 18a on page 123.  (The 
photograph in the upper left quadrant of Illustration 18 is a rather crude composite in 
which Awlaki’s head is placed on the shoulders of another mujahid.)  This visual 
communication is nowhere accompanied by any claims of actual jihadi combat anywhere 
other than the mediascape.  It is fascinating to remember that Awlaki was perceived as a 
threat by the U.S. in both ideological and operational spheres.  Without question, the U.S. 
saw him as a far greater threat armed with a “pen,” as opposed to a “sword.”241  Awlaki 
may have believed the ‘pen is mightier than the sword,’ but he clearly concluded his 
readers needed to envision him as a traditionally armed jihadist.  Issues of the magazine 
are replete with weaponry.  Firearms and small weapons appear 205 times in the maga-
zines eight standard editions.242  See Illustrations 3, 14, 15, 20, 21, 23, and 25 (on pages 
107, 118, 119, 126, 127, 129 and 131 respectively) for a small sampling of weaponry 
visuals in the magazine.  These pictures are always associated with males.  These 
photographs convey personal power, suggest significant and varied weaponry, seek to 
illustrate esprit de corps and convey an aura of mysterious identity in all except the 
picture “documenting” Awlaki’s jihadi credentials. 
     Returning to al Suri’s promotion of individual jihad, he offers an explanation linking 
religious duty to terrorist action.  In this article, al Suri offers a clear example of what 
Wiktorowicz identified as “rational choice” behavior, “how spiritual incentives inspire 
Islamic radicalism.”243  Al Suri writes, “Yes, we are terrorists towards Allah’s enemies.  
From this it follows that terrorism has been commanded in Allah’s book, and in situations 
where the mujahidin are repelling their enemy and the enemy’s terror through a defen- 
sive jihad.  This is one of the most important religious duties.  In fact there is no duty 
more obligatory than this, except believing that Allah is One, as has been established by 
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Islamic jurists and clerics.”  Wiktorowicz explains, “For those who accepted the move-
ment ideology and sought salvation, a refusal to engage in high-cost/risk activism was 
tantamount to violating self-interest, because it meant that they would go to Hell.”244 
Al Suri continues with Koranic references, observing “So the most important of the jihadi 
actions is the liquidation of leaders by murder and assassination.”  In an effort to link 
contemporary conflict with historic conflicts dating back to the time of the Prophet 
Muhammed, al Suri writes, “This was confirmed in a number of separate events when 
Muhammed sent mujahidin units to assassinate leaders of disbelief of his time.”245  Al 
Suri expresses concern that individual jihad actions must be “part of a program…and a 
strategic operational method.”246  In his next article, he writes of “spreading the culture of 
resistance” and “directing the Resistance fighters to areas of operation suitable for 
Individual Terrorism.”  His use of “resistance” is likely an attempt to carry on the theme 
of defensive jihad.  His capitalizations are apparently intended to add linguistic stature 
and a measure of authority.  He also advises “instructing the youth in the armed opera-
tional method” and “building the cells of Resistance units as a ‘system of action,’ not as 
‘a secret organization’ [or penetrable network,] which enemy “security agencies [could] 
abort.”247 
    The ninth and tenth issues of the magazine contain al Suri’s last arguments in favor of 
individual or small cell jihad.  He identifies a principal goal “to inflict as many human 
and material losses as possible upon the interests of America and her allies, and to make 
them feel that the Resistance has transformed into a phenomenon of popular [wide-
spread] uprising against them.”  He seeks to move the public to believe that America is 
under a continuing barrage of attacks, not merely sporadic or random strikes.  He 
encourages prospective jihadis living in America to stay put and fight in locations with 
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which they are intimately familiar.  Al Suri believes “lone wolf” operations are the least 
likely to be penetrated and interdicted by intelligence and law enforcement agencies.  He 
suggests specific targets, including “main political figures, such as heads of state, military 
and security leaders.”  He favors attacks against “large strategic economic [centers], the 
NYSE, power and oil installations, airports, harbors, railroad systems, bridges and 
highway tunnels.”  While he generally favors “soft” targets, such as places where tourists 
or civilians congregate, he encourages carefully planned attacks against hardened targets 
like “military bases and barracks.”  He favors “mass slaughter, targeting crowds in order 
to inflict maximum losses.”  Al Suri is especially drawn to “easy” targets like “crowded 
sports arenas, large international exhibitions, crowded marketplaces and buildings.”248  In 
the magazine’s tenth issue, al Suri opens the article with some religious justifications for 
jihad, praises the “blessed operation” of the 2004 Madrid subway system bombing, which 
killed 200 and injured 1,700, and describes “good targets” as “places where Muslims 
should not be such as places of sin, night clubs as in Bali, mardi gras, and financial 
centers like the Twin Towers [destroyed on 9/11.]”249       
    Awlaki, of course, seeks to use Inspire to repeatedly promote individual and small cell 
jihadism, to normalize al Suri’s theoretical imperative, to provide multiple articles with 
very similar streams of information, all converging to propel impressionable, often 
young, jihadis to take up arms.  Many photographs are also used in the magazine to 
augment the text.  Examples of such articles follow, along with references to relevant 
photographs.  Articles under the headings of “What to Expect in Jihad” and “My Life in 
Jihad” act to “spread the culture of resistance” by presenting role model jihadis and 
providing an avenue for aspiring jihadis to imagine themselves engaged in “noble” and 
exciting adventures.  See Illustrations 24 and 25 on pages 130 and 131.250 
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4.3h Awlaki Adds Other Voices of Jihad    
    Two of the first three articles, written explicitly to encourage and embolden prospec-
tive young jihadis, carry the byline of Mukhtar Hassan, an experienced jihadi.  The page 
layouts of the introductory article are composites of images intended to show a literal 
desktop of a jihadi living in the U.S.  Picture elements include scraps of notebook paper, 
maps and pen, U.S. coins, a semi-automatic handgun with random bullets, pictures of 
jihadist compatriots, as well as snapshots of street scenes with architecture suggesting the 
Middle East.  See Illustrations 24 and 25 on pages 130 and 131.  The text is cautionary 
and nearly avuncular.  “Knowing what to expect in jihad is vital in order to avoid 
confusion, shock and even depression.”  Other suggestions relate to packing “bodily 
cleansing items and “flexible boots.”  Tedium is described as a serious liability to 
psychological health.  “Transition in mindset” is essential, as young jihadis attempt to 
shed their old identities for a new carapace as a “defender of Islam.”251  A genuine 
affection for budding com- 
rades can easily be inferred from the text.  
    In “My Life in Jihad,” Commander Uthman al Ghamidi writes about his frustration 
with secular life and “the day when Allah guided me to the true path.”  The merging of 
the mundane and divine is a repeating theme in Awlaki’s Inspire.  Similar to Hassan’s 
approach, Ghamidi writes reassuringly, “I was impressed with the organization of the 
brothers [radical Islamists,] their transportation, communication network, their coor-
dination, and [their provision of ] new [fake] passports.”  The article suggests profess-
sionalism coupled with genuine, almost familial, warmth.  “During our ride to the 
guesthouse, the brother was taking every opportunity to welcome me…I saw men of dif- 
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ferent nationalities and they were all welcoming me with smiles on their faces.  The Amir 
of the guesthouse offered me [a phone] to call my family to let them know I arrived 
safely.”  Ghamidi’s narrative repeats the theme of a higher calling, “All of these brothers 
came together for one purpose: to serve Islam.”252  He writes of the joy among the new 
recruits when they were introduced to Osama bin Laden at a training camp in Afghan-
istan and told of a large, imminent operation against America.  “A few hours later the 
world was struck with the news of September 11.  We couldn’t believe it at first.  We had 
humiliated America and struck it on its own soil, using its own planes as weapons.” 
     Photographs illustrate “defenders of Islam” in the vestments of anonymity, masks with 
eyeholes removed, preceding wide-angle shots of the WTC burning.  See Illustrations 17a 
and 17b on pages 121 and 122.  Ghamidi writes of a nearly intoxicating euphoria, 
tempered by a training instructor’s blunt wake-up call, “What we expect from you in this 
place [the training camp] is blind obedience.”  After a sobering description of fighting in 
Afghanistan, Ghamidi concludes with a call for “steadfastness” in jihad.  His closing 
lines link individual jihad with the very real possibility of martyrdom, “where you will 
see things which an eye has never seen, an ear has never heard and a mind has never 
imagined.”253  Another “What to Expect in Jihad” article in the fourth issue of Inspire 
contains a full-page bleed photograph, which focuses on an AK-47 cradled by a jihadi.  
See Illustration 23 on page 129.  The accompanying text describes violent jihad as a 
“pillar and foundation” of Islam.  The final sentence, the text paralleling the gun barrel, is 
explicit with the last word printed in blood red, “The religion can neither be established 
nor can Islam gain a foothold without jihad—period.”254 
    Mukhtar Hassan authors the final article in the “What to Expect in Jihad” series. It 
begins with, “Our vision in training is to make every mujahid an army by himself that 
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roams the earth, knowing what to do in many situations and has the ability to devastate 
the enemy like a thousand-man army.”  That sentence clearly encourages “lone wolf” 
jihadism.  Hassan encourages new jihadis to absorb articles on “weaponry, chemistry and 
fighting styles…that are widely available on the internet.”  “Inspire” is itself an example 
of weaponized media, as has been documented in this thesis, offering DIY instructions 
for firearms training, explosive and incendiary bomb construction, creation of IEDs, 
multiple adaptations of vehicles as weapons and selection of “soft” targets.  Hassan states 
raw physical strength is less important than “stamina training.”255  The series’ article 
titles change but the focus of the content remains the same. 
    “It is either Jihad or Disgrace, So Choose” is the article title in the sixth issue of the 
magazine.  Shaykh Abu Yahya al Libi is the author.  It essentially defends violent jihad 
by referencing many verses from the Koran and the Prophet Muhammed’s teachings.  
The killings of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011 and Anwar al Awlaki on November 30, 
2011, heavily influenced the content of the magazine’s latter issues.  Al Libi authored the 
article, “Take from their guidance for there is no refuge from jihad,” which appeared in 
the fall of 2011.  Like his previous article on jihad, al Libi expresses the belief that jihad 
is obligatory and martyrdom assures “paradise, eternal life and provision.” 
    Awlaki’s focus within the magazine centers on shaping the identity of young jihadis, 
without whom various forms of jihad, or “defense of Islam,” would allegedly wither. 
Awlaki strongly believes in Salafi jihadism, which obviously could not manifest without 
the active participation of fighters.  Thus far in this thesis, analysis has concentrated on 
articles bearing on justifications for violent jihad, as well as logistical and strategic efforts 
to train, psychologically prepare and otherwise encourage and reassure jihadis.  Evidence 
has been presented that suggests the efficacy of individual and small cell attacks.  An 
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analysis follows of other Inspire articles which provide evidence as to how Awlaki 
influenced a process of identity formation in his target audience. 
 
4.3i Identity and Authenticity: Grounded in Islam 
    Awlaki included an article in the eighth issue of the magazine entitled, “Blended 
duality: Muslim and American?”  The question mark, which follows the article’s title, is 
the first indication that the concept of merging “Muslim” and “American” is immediately 
suspect.  The article carries Samir Khan’s byline.  It specifically addresses identity and 
allegiance in conceptual terms.  In the article’s first paragraph, Khan suggests that in 
America a Muslim cannot be a practicing “true believer.”  He writes, “the much reform- 
ed Muslim identity continues to search for itself in an unbalanced world.  It is a world 
that says faith and country should coalesce into a culturally accepted manifestation of re- 
ligion.”  Not surprisingly, Khan sees religion in America as subordinate to citizenship.  
Conceiving of religion and nationality as separate spheres, “apples and oranges,” is 
apparently problematic, as he makes clear in the following lines.  He concludes this is “a 
secular world that most Muslim Americans feel obliged to be enslaved in.”256  Khan 
demeans Muslim Americans, calling them “an inexperienced and impressionable com-
munity,” which finds itself in “an identity predicament much like a midlife crisis.”  He 
writes, “To say one is proud of being American is not merely a cultural declaration but 
one of allegiance.”  Khan’s article supports Awlaki’s position that a Muslim’s identity is 
first and foremost grounded in Islam.  Allegiance is exclusively to Allah, not to any secu-
lar national entity.  He concludes in the last paragraph, “To be a Muslim is one thing 
while to be an American is another.”  To accompany the article, a stock photo was 
selected of a blurred figure, perhaps in a subway station, walking past a poster adapted 
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from the classic Uncle Sam U.S. Army original, reading “We Want You!”257  The poster, 
created by “ClearanceJobs.com,” advertises openings in the “defense and security” 
industry, many of which may have materialized after the 9/11 attacks.  The posters 
typography is readable, if enlarged in a web browser.  See Illustration 26 on page 132.  
To identify the stock photo and its message as “appropriate,” would be to seriously 
understate its resonance.   
    An article authored by Yahya Ibrahim entitled, “The West should ban the Niqab 
covering its Real Face,” encourages Muslim women to wear modest traditional Islamic 
clothing, including the niqab.  Ibrahim is very critical of French efforts to ban the 
wearing of the head garment in public.  He rails at French statements about the niqab 
serving “as a symbol of subservience and abasement” and its alleged capacity to imprison 
a woman” and “deprive her of her identity.”  Ibrahim dismisses “the Western myth that 
Muslim women need to be emancipated.”258  Though Ibrahim does not address the well 
known young Pakistani woman in Inspire, a question arises as to his perspective on the 
education of Malala Yousafzai and her near assassination at the hands of the Taliban.  
Nor does he address the murder of Sushmita Banerjee of Kabul, Afghanistan, “author of a 
popular memoir of life under the Taliban,” who was shot dead September 4, 2013, after 
“militant [Taliban] leaders sentenced her to death after she refused to wear a burqa in 
public.”259  Ibrahim’s article opens a window on Awlaki’s and AQAP’s worldview, 
especially relating to human rights.  The article is highly suggestive of Awlaki’s pro-
motion of Sharia law and his desire to influence reader opinions and activities to conform 
with conservative interpretations of it.  As evidence, the very next article, spanning five 
pages in the same Inspire inaugural issue, entitled,  “The Dust Will Never Settle Down 
Campaign,” rails against “the Cartoon Crusade,” which was seen to be “criminally” 
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disrespectful to the Prophet Muhammad.260       
    Awlaki authors an article in the fifth edition of the magazine entitled, “The Tsunami of 
Change.”  In it he identifies “the first large-scale operation by the modern jihad move- 
ment,” which is the assassination of Anwar Sadat.261  In the article, Awlaki attempts to 
make a case that the “collective mind of the ummah” helped bring down Mubarak’s gov- 
ernment.  Awlaki did not see the government changes in Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya as 
outgrowths of a repressed desire for democratic systems.  In a “Jihadisphere” section of  
the eighth issue of the magazine, Awlaki promotes articles which rhetorically ask, “Are 
we witnessing the tyrannical kingship phase [passing] and the return of Islamic rule?”  
The “kingship phase” refers to the autocratic regimes of Ben Ali Said in Tunisia, Hosni 
Mubarak in Egypt, and Moammar Gadhafi in Libya.262  In Pakistan, Awlaki endorses 
Ahmad Farooq’s book, which, according to Awlaki, does not merely argue in favor of 
jihad to replace the current regime of Mamnoon Hussain in Pakistan but rather to “uproot 
the structure as a whole, along with all of its institutions and infrastructure.”  In these 
articles, Awlaki is attempting to suggest a progression, albeit slowly advancing, toward 
the realization of a cohesive global Muslim community.  The concept of ummah is an 
essential, endgame component of Salafi jihadism.  It represents a supposedly attainable 
caliphate for which young jihadis must fight and die in the present era. 
    Questions have been raised about Inspire’s pedigree, its authenticity and linkage to 
Awlaki, Khan and AQAP.  The magazine exists online with no print media edition.  In 
many respects, it is a mysterious publication not linked to a physical address of any sort.  
However, its online manifestation is very real.  The surviving alleged perpetrator of the 
Boston Marathon bombing admitted using the magazine for bomb-making instructions.263  
Inspire is accessible in the U.S. to nearly anyone with even rudimentary computer 
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literacy.  In the United Kingdom, it is illegal to possess in any form, unless for official 
use or authorized, academic purpose.264 
4.4 The Primary Source Material: Shaping Group Identities 
    In the pages of Inspire, Awlaki promoted Salafi jihadism, a form of radical Islam, 
which argues that violent jihad is required to “defend” the religion from dilution and 
attrition.  He worked to shape the identities of two communities: individual jihadis and 
the much broader, unified, global community of Muslims, the ummah.  While he saw 
autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa as enemies or, in his terms 
“apostate” governments, his wrath was especially pronounced for a select number of 
Western powers.  The U.S., Britain and France were “infidels” and condemned in the 
strongest terms.  Evidence has been presented that Awlaki saw individual jihadis as 
building blocks with which a global wall of resistance could be erected.  Awlaki 
recognized that individual jihadis, or small cells, required moral support, strategic and 
tactical advice, and ongoing spiritual reassurances that they were on the right path and 
not alone.  He saw the magazine as an important tool to communicate with his “com-
munity of loners,” to use Raffaello Pantucci’s phrase.    
    Part of Awlaki’s shaping of group identity relied on the magazine to normalize a 
discourse of radical Islam.  That discourse was presented to incent individual jihadis to 
accept and often seek martyrdom in their “defense of Islam.”  The discourse was also 
intended to characterize Salafi jihadism as a necessary stage along the path to uniting a 
global Muslim community, the ummah.  Describing the magazine’s discourse in ob- 
jective terms has presented significant challenges in this thesis.  In preface to the coming 
summary, I concede bias and admit efforts to veil it have been unproductive.  Even the 
placing of quotation marks exposes a perspective.  With that acknowledgement, pillars of 
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Awlaki’s discourse include: lionizing jihadis, praising their “obligatory” resistance, 
delivering assurances of “paradise” should “martyrdom” result, offering Koranic 
justifications for atrocities of war, attempting to instill an esprit de corps among jihadi 
“brothers,” excoriating religious pluralism and promoting a patriarchal and antiquarian 
social order, where females are deemed unworthy of equal educational opportunities.265  
His passionate and genuine belief in Salafi jihadism is reflected in the magazine’s con- 
tent.  He sought to not only provide intellectual and psychological food for his readers 
but, more importantly, to instill a visceral and simultaneously spiritual impetus toward 
violent jihad.    
    Another part of Awlaki’s shaping of group identity has been a wide-ranging but subtle 
campaign to convince readers of his own knowledge, power and capacity to educate his 
target audience of Muslims living in the West.  An example of his campaign’s shrouded 
discourse is referenced and documented in Chapter Four, section 4.3d, pages 51-53 of 
this thesis.  In those pages the random slaughter of non-combatants is encouraged and 
then “justified” by Awlaki’s interpretations of the Koran.  His titles of Shaykh and imam 
were potent appellations, intended to authenticate his opinions and pronouncements in the 
magazine.  Photographs depict Awlaki as a sage teacher.  See Illustration 18b on page 
124.  Martyrdom was frequently cited as an objective.  With death as an endgame, 
Awlaki’s arguments demanded his narrative be emotionally compelling.  Young 
“martyred” jihadis were pictured, often smiling, floating in the heavens.  See Illustration 
22 on page 128. 
    Inspire has been attributed to AQAP, an affiliate of al Qaeda.  Awlaki published an 
article authored by Fazul Abdallah entitled, “What is al Qaeda?”  It is little more than a 
half page in length, and its first sentence answers the question succinctly, “Al Qaeda is an 
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Islamic group which raises the flag of jihad to espouse and support the Haqq (truth of 
Islam) wherever it is found.”  Abdallah states al Qaeda’s “long term goal is to re-establish 
the Islamic Caliphate through Jihad in the cause of Allah and to implement Shariah.”  
The article closes with the following statements, revealing delusions braided with steely 
certitude: “We [presumably the magazine’s staff] are proud that every muslim (sic) 
believes in the Islamic unity and waging jihad against kuffar (disbelievers or infidels) 
who occupy our lands.  And every muslim (sic) has the same ideology as that of al 
Qaeda’s.”266  
 
4.5 Awlaki’s “Quest for Meaning” and Embrace of Islam  
     An overview of Anwar al Awlaki’s life traces many years living in the very different 
worlds of late 20th century America and the small, developing nation of Yemen in the 
Middle East.  He was exposed to radically different influences.  In America, a permissive 
culture was encountered.  By his father’s account, educational opportunities were abun-
dant, though America’s widespread tolerance of religious diversity clearly did not 
implant in the younger Awlaki.267  On a youthful path to a career in civil engineering, 
Scahill reports that Awlaki was diverted by a taste of teaching and sharing a growing 
interest in Islam at an Islamic center in Ft. Collins, Colorado.  He experienced as a 
Muslim-American the rising tide of confusion and hostility toward Muslims, which 
followed the 9/11 attacks.  He was sought after by the media and expressed criticism for 
the attackers, forcefully stating, “There is no way that the people who did this could be 
Muslim, if they claim to be Muslim, then they have perverted their religion.”268  The 
record reveals Awlaki’s transformation gradually from a moderate Muslim to a Salafi 
jihadist, ultimately becoming a leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.   
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    There is no question that Awlaki found in radical Islam clear and compelling solutions 
for Maslow’s classic “hierarchy of needs.”269  In Islam Awlaki found self-actualization, 
self-esteem, a sense of belonging, a sense of safety in this world and a belief in eternal 
security in paradise.  Research for this thesis consistently indicated Awlaki displayed a 
sincere and passionate belief in the religion of Islam as the one and true path to Allah. 
He saw the religion as worthy of his primary focus, as the foundation of his identity in 
secular and spiritual terms, and perhaps most importantly, saw it as worthy of his alleg-
iance to the exclusion of all else.  In the magazine Awlaki encourages young jihadis to 
follow his example and those of other lionized jihadis.  “Allegiance” is not a word 
normally encountered in analysis of religious conviction.  For Awlaki Islam served to 
fulfill a sense of belonging normally reserved for one’s homeland.  Awlaki portrayed 
himself as a jihadi.  He is quoted in the magazine as stating, “We will fight for him 
[Prophet Mohammed,] we will instigate, we will bomb and we will assassinate, and may 
our mothers be bereaved of us if we do not rise in his defense.”270  See Illustration 13 on 
page 117.  According to Shaykh Abu Hurairah as Sana’ani’s eulogy in the magazine, “Al 
Awlaki was killed and this was an end he wanted and was searching for.”  In the end, his 
identity, his allegiance and his death intertwined.   
 
4.6 Discussion and Limitations     
    I approached the research and analysis for this thesis as an American academic. 
Though I certainly am not part of what might be described as Inspire’s first tier target 
audience, Muslims living in the West, I am indeed personally linked to the conflict.  My 
link is rooted in my U.S. citizenship and my recognition that I am one fragment of what 
al Qaeda deems to be the enemy population on an exceedingly asymmetric and global 
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battlefield.  In a spirit of full disclosure, I will state that the morning of the 9/11 attacks 
was the most emotionally searing in my memory.  Recalling that day, my focus was, 
“Who did this and why?”  While I confess bias, the intervening twelve years have left me 
with a residual intellectual curiosity about al Qaeda, in general, and Anwar al Awlaki, 
specifically, which has fueled my research for this thesis.  I do not speak Arabic and my 
study of Islam was undertaken as a necessary part of contextualizing the relevant material 
for this thesis.  Awlaki’s embrace of Salafi jihadism has forced me to focus on the 
unavoidable relevance in my research of this conservative branch of Islam.  Reading 
Tariq Ramadan has provided relief from Salafism-induced myopia and provided insight 
into “the quest for meaning” that underpins much of Awlaki’s argumentation.  My 
analysis of Inspire is based on a thorough and wide-ranging consideration of the text, 
graphics, photography, themes and overall content presented by its creators.  My central 
focus involves Awlaki’s efforts to influence identity formation in his target audience. 
    Anwar al Awlaki is dead but may well live on through his sermons, writings and the 
issues of Inspire that he created with Samir Khan.  His relative importance in historic 
terms may depend largely on how the present conflict between the West and radical 
Islamists ebbs and flows.  In the veiled and, at times, impossibly opaque world of violent 
extremists, clarity and certainty about individuals and their motives is in short supply.  It 
is unfortunate that a few dedicated individuals can create remarkable carnage and terror 
in this world.  The Boston Marathon Bombing was a stark reminder of Awlaki’s continu-
ing influence.  Awlaki preached violent jihad and with Abu Mus’ab al Suri may have 
convinced a significant number of young, impressionable jihadis that the ummah, the 
imagined, global Islamic nation, can manifest itself from the ashes of destruction.  Terror-
ists seek to instill fear and, if that is the measure, they are presently very powerful.  
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Awlaki and his colleagues within al Qaeda and its affiliates deserve to be studied, taken 
seriously, not merely in military terms, as significant adversaries.   
    To that end, and admittedly against long odds, further productive research would 
include thorough, open-ended, non-confrontational interviews with Awlaki’s remaining 
family and inner circle.  Understanding his life and his thinking from the perspective of 
those closest to him would no doubt yield insights.  Creating opportunities for young 
American Muslims to express their frustrations with America and to describe what they 
find appealing about the U.S. would be a valuable exercise.  Defusing the threat of 
terrorism within the Muslim community in the U.S. may ultimately rest largely on 
working deliberately to establish mundane common bonds through education, employ-
ment, interfaith and community interaction.   
    Individuals like Maajid Nawaz, author of Radical, My Journey Out of Islamist Extrem-
ism, may be remarkably powerful in influencing young Muslims.  His memoir is written 
in a young man’s voice.  But in the preface to the U.S. edition, his scholarship is evident: 
“…extremists on both sides seek to perpetuate an illusory dichotomy; they falsely jux-
tapose a highly charged and politicized Muslim religious identity with an incomparable 
Western one.”271  The quest for meaning is an integral part of life, exposing young minds 
to available pathways would seem to be key.  One of America’s powerful soft power 
assets remains an abiding belief in and respect for diversity and pluralism.  If the battle is 
ultimately about hearts and minds, continuing educational research is essential. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
    The case of Anwar al Awlaki centers on the transformation of a U.S. citizen from a 
moderate teacher and imam to a leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and on the 
principal product of his life, Inspire magazine.  The magazine promoted an ideological 
and religiously based nationalism, which was de-territorialized, and which focused on 
ultimately achieving an ummah, an imagined global Islamic community under a caliph. 
The mechanism for achieving this imagined community was to be violent jihad. My 
research did not reveal any semblance of the formation of a caliphate. 
    The research did attempt to illuminate the discourses Awlaki employed in his efforts to 
shape the identity of young jihadis, without whom triumphal battles would be impossible.  
This thesis argues that Awlaki subtly worked to embellish his personal power, in order to 
enhance the perceived credibility of his military campaign and his interpretations of  
Islam. This thesis provided evidence of how the magazine, which Awlaki helped to 
create, served to justify jihad in religious terms, lionized jihadis and offered assurances of 
an eternal paradise awaiting fallen fighters.  The power and capacity of digital online 
media is evidenced in this thesis by the inclusion within Inspire of a revealing statement 
attributed to al Qaeda’s current presumptive leader, Ayman al Zawahiri, “We are in a 
battle and more than half this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.  We are 
in a race for [the] hearts and minds of our ummah.”272  Additional evidence supporting 
the potency of digital media is reflected in the NYPD’s Counterterrorism Division’s 
assessment of Awlaki as “the most dangerous man in the world.”273 
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    Research for this thesis documented Awlaki’s subtle efforts in the magazine to create 
an online resource which promoted the efficacy of various stages of jihad and which 
sought to instill a sense of esprit de corps and community for lone jihadis.  Most impor-
tantly, Inspire’s very existence worked to normalize jihad and to imply the presence of a 
significant, if unknown, number of potential jihadis.  The magazine was created for a 
target audience of Muslims living chiefly in the U.S. and Britain.  One testament to its 
potency is reflected in the British government’s decision to make possession of the 
magazine a crime under the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act.274   
    Awlaki’s obvious endorsement of Abu Mus’ab al Suri’s strategy of individual “lone 
wolf” jihad clearly challenges U.S. interdiction efforts.  As Leon Panetta, the former CIA 
director said, “It is the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay attention to as the 
main threat to this country.”275  Though the NSA has without doubt massive capacity to 
track digital communications of all sorts, individual jihadis who do not communicate 
electronically, pose a serious threat.  The very existence of Inspire may well suggest to a 
potential jihadi that his views and objectives are held by many others.   
    To return to a point made in the introduction to this thesis, a fundamental effect of 
media is to unite communities.  Research for this thesis provides evidence that media can 
also fuel divisive communities.  It is no accident that Awlaki promoted in the magazine 
the concept of allegiance solely to Allah.  Awlaki framed jihad as obligatory and expres-
sed his identity as a Muslim first and foremost.  The notion of allegiance to a religion is 
exceedingly uncommon in the pluralistic cultures of the West, especially in the U.S.  
Individual human rights and multiple freedoms of expression are sacrosanct in American 
culture, including, of course, freedom of religion, as well as the separation of church and 
state.  Concepts of egalitarianism and unfettered self-actualization widely accepted in the 
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West are directly contrary to the dictates of Awlaki’s expressed Salafism.  The case of 
Anwar al Awlaki illustrates the explosive collision of opposing worldviews and belief 
systems on media platforms and dispersed traditional battlefields.  
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 Inspire Magazine Illustration 1 
    (from How to Build a Bomb in Your Mother’s Kitchen) 
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 Inspire Magazine Illustration 2 
                                              (Cover Graphics of Inspire 4th Issue) 
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      Inspire Magazine Illustration 3 
                  (Jihad Today, Jannah Tomorrow) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 4 
      (Abu Ali al Harithi: Martyrs as Heroes) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 5 
      (Abu Ali al Harithi: Martyrs as Heroes) 
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          Inspire Magazine Illustration 6 
        (Ammar al Wa’ili: Martyr’s as Heroes) 
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          Inspire Magazine Illustration 7 
                 (Fawaz al Ma’ribi: Martyrs as Heroes) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 8 
        (Fawas al Ma’ribi: Martyrs as Heroes) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 9 
            (Abu Ayman: Martyrs as Heroes) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 10 
(Abu Ayman: Martyrs as Heroes) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 11 
            (First page of Special Tribute to Fallen Jihadis 
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        Inspire Magazine Illustration 12 
           (Ember bomb instructions) 
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       Inspire Magazine Illustration 13  
                  (Awlaki proclaiming his desire for combatant status) 
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        Inspire Magazine Illustration 14 
   (Awlaki’s praise for Nidal Hasan’s rampage at Ft. Hood) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 15 
     (Graphic page promoting assassination of Christian fanatic Terry Jones) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 16 
       (Page promoting assassination of specific individuals) 
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     Inspire Magazine Illustration 17a 
  (Wielding Power in the form of rifles in al Suri article) 
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    Inspire Magazine Illustration 17b 
    (Young incognito jihadis with arms) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 18a 
       (Photographs accompanying articles with Awlaki’s byline) 
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          Inspire Magazine Illustration 18b 
 (Awlaki in role of wise teacher) 
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         Inspire Magazine Illustration 19 
(Building destruction using bomb placement) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 20 
    (Weaponry illustrating a variety of articles) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 21 
 (Assassination in contemporary urban context) 
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           Inspire Magazine Illustration 22 
(Movie poster depiction of martyrs in paradise) 
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                      Inspire Magazine Illustration 23 
          (Violent jihad as a religious and tactical imperative) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 24 
    (Aids to imagining a life as a young jihadi) 
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Inspire Magazine Illustration 25 
    (Aids to imagining a life as a young jihadi) 
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      Inspire Magazine Illustration 26 
                  (Accompanying article on Muslim American identity) 
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         Inspire Magazine Illustration 27 
         (Instructions for making acetone peroxide bomb) 
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           Appendix    
Web URL’s for First Ten Issues of Inspire Magazine 
 
 
 
 
 
Issue #1 http://info.publicintelligence.net/CompleteInspire.pdf 
 
Issue #2 http://publicintelligence.net/complete-inspire-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-   
peninsula-magazine-issue-2-fall-2010/ 
 
Issue #3 http://publicintelligence.net/inspire-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-
magazine-november-2010-special-issue/ 
 
Issue #4 http://publicintelligence.net/inspire-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-
magazine-issue-4-january-2011/ 
 
Issue #5 http://info.publicintelligence.net/InspireMarch2011.pdf 
 
Issue #6 http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/inspire-magazine-6.pdf 
  
Issue #7 http://publicintelligence.net/inspire-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-
magazine-issue-7-september-2011/ 
 
Issue #8 & 9    http://publicintelligence.net/inspire-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-
magazine-issues-8-and-9-may-2012/ 
 
Issue #10 http://publicintelligence.net/aqap-inspire-issue-10/ 
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